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PULLING THE FIG LEAF OFF THE RIGHT OF
PRIVACY: SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION
Donald H.J. Hermann*
INTRODUCTION
In 1961, Justice John Marshall Harlan provided the first explicit rec-
ognition of a constitutional right of privacy in a Supreme Court opin-
ion.' In his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, in which the majority sustained
dismissal of a motion for declaratory judgment seeking to declare a
state's anti-contraceptive laws unconstitutional, Justice Harlan sup-
ported recognition of "a claim based on the right of privacy embraced
in the 'liberty' of the Due Process Clause," because "it is difficult to
imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and
wife's marital relations." 2 However, Justice Harlan was explicit in
avoiding any claim that a constitutional right of privacy provided the
basis for a more general protected right to engage in sexual relations.
Justice Harlan concluded,
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which
the State forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is
necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of
marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but
which always and in every age it has fostered and protected. It is
one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-
marital sexuality altogether ... but it is quite another when, having
acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it under-
takes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that
intimacy. 3
It was not until 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas,4 that the Supreme Court
explicitly answered the broader question: "Whether petitioners' crimi-
nal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home vio-
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, DePaul University; A.B., 1965, Stanford University; J.D.,
1968, Columbia University; L.L.M., 1974, Harvard University; M.A., 1979, Northwestern Uni-
versity; Ph.D., 1981, Northwestern University; M.A.A.H., 1993, School of the Art Institute of
Chicago; M.L.A., 2001 University of Chicago. This Article grew out of a presentation made at
the Symposium: Privacy and Identity: Constructing, Maintaining, and Protecting Personhood,
held on March 13, 2004 at DePaul University College of Law.
1. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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lates their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 5 Writing for the
Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded: "When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows [even] homosexual per-
sons the right to make this choice."'6
This Article examines the opinions of the United States Supreme
Court dealing with claims of constitutional protection from state regu-
lations of sexual activity including sterilization, contraception, abor-
tion, and sodomy. The Article concludes that ultimately, in Lawrence
v. Texas, the Court recognizes the right of adults to freedom from limi-
tations on the right to sexual intimacy based solely on moral grounds.
Part II begins with an examination of the apparent reluctance of the
Court to address sexual questions except in conventional terms of
procreational sex within marriage, and the seeming hesitation of the
Court to recognize claims to sexual freedom derived from substantive
due process. Part III examines a series of opinions striking down anti-
contraceptive statutes originally within the context of marriage, and
then extending the right to contraception to unmarried persons and
minors. Special note is made of the Court's recognition of the possi-
ble implications of its contraception decisions for establishment of a
broader right of sexual intimacy. Part IV then examines the Court's
decisions recognizing a right to abortion. Part V reviews the Court's
initial consideration of the constitutionality of criminal sodomy stat-
utes and its formulation of the issue as: Whether there is a right to
engage in homosexual sodomy. This Article next assesses the signifi-
cance of dissenting opinions that challenged the constitutional issue
posed by criminal sodomy statutes. The analysis of the Court's second
sodomy opinion leads to the conclusion that the Court has recognized
a right to sexual intimacy, which cannot be limited or regulated by
state laws solely based on moral condemnation of the specific sexual
conduct. Finally, Part VI examines a series of federal court opinions
challenging parts of a state anti-obscenity statute prohibiting the sale
of devices primarily used for stimulation of human genitals. I con-
clude that a statute regulating access of adults to sexual devices is con-
stitutionally infirm in light of the Supreme Court's recognition in
Lawrence v. Texas of a right to sexual intimacy.
5. Id. at 564.
6. Id. at 567.
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II. JUDICIAL ASEXUALITY AND PROCREATIONAL SEX
It has taken almost a half century to arrive at the conclusion that
the "liberty" protected by the U.S. Constitution, which includes a
right of privacy, extends to sexual relations between consenting adults
in private. The explanations for the gradual recognition of a right to
engage in sex must include the religious history of the United States,
which has linked sex outside of marriage to sin.7 It is also important
to recall when considering the evolving law addressing sexual issues,
the development of contraceptives and family planning, the changing
roles of women in American society, and changing sexual mores ac-
companying urbanization. 8
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has suggested another reason why members of the
judiciary have been hesitant to address issues of sex. In his mono-
graph Sex and Reason, Judge Posner wrote:
[J]udges know next to nothing about the subject [of sex] beyond
their own personal experience, which is limited, perhaps more so
than average, because people with irregular sex lives are pretty
much (not entirely, of course) screened out of the judiciary-espe-
cially the federal judiciary, with its elaborate preappointment inves-
tigations by the FBI and other bodies. This screening, along with
the gap, for which the screening is in part responsible, in judges sys-
tematic knowledge of sex is a residue of the nation's puritan-more
broadly of its Christian-heritage. Another residue is the large
body of laws regulating sex which judges are called on to interpret
and apply, and sometimes asked to invalidate. 9
Support for the view that lack of experience and knowledge about
sexual matters partially explains the apparent reluctance to extend ex-
plicit recognition of a liberty interest in sexual intimacy is provided by
Justice Lewis Powell's decision to vote with the majority in Bowers v.
7. LEE J. D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUAL-
ITY IN AMERICA 4 (1997). In this religious history,
[tihe idea that marriage was acceptable primarily as a way to channel lust and prevent
sexual sin gave way to a belief that marital love, as well as the need to produce children,
could justify sexual intercourse. At the same time, by placing a new emphasis on the
importance of sexuality within marriage, Protestantism distinguished more clearly be-
tween proper sexual expression-that which led to reproduction-and sexual trans-
gressions-acts that occurred outside of marriage and for purposes other than
reproduction.
Id. Some religious denominations continue to condemn sexual relations outside of marriage and
nonprocreative sex. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2351, at 564 (2d ed.
2000) ("Sexual pleasure is morally disordered when sought for itself, isolated from its procrea-
tive and unitive purposes [between married persons.]").
8. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 326--43.
9. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992).
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Hardwick, upholding Georgia's criminal sodomy law. 10 Justice Pow-
ell's biographer, John Jeffries, reported:
Emblematic of Powell's difficulty with this [Bowers] case, and the
most puzzling element in its history, was the remark that he had
never known a homosexual. He said it at least twice, once to his
clerk and once at the Conference on April 2 [1986]. [Justice] Black-
mun later told his clerks that he thought of saying, "Of course you
have. You've even had gay clerks." Instead Blackmun said, "But
surely, Lewis, you were approached as a boy?" There is no record
of a response.
Was Powell being honest? He had in fact employed gay clerks
and had also encountered homosexuals working elsewhere in the
Court, as he must have encountered them in school, in private prac-
tice, in the army, and elsewhere. Of course Powell knew homosexu-
als. The question was whether he acknowledged anyone he knew as
a homosexual. The answer is that he did not, largely because he did
not want to. In his upbringing, homosexuality was at least a failing,
if not a sin. He later came to think of it as an abnormality, an afflic-
tion for which its bearers perhaps should not be blamed but which
was nevertheless vaguely scandalous. He would not make assump-
tions. He would not infer such misfortune without direct knowl-
edge. Powell would not have known someone was homosexual
unless that person told him so. 1
In their book, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme
Court, published before the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v.
Texas, Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price expressed optimism that Su-
preme Court Justices would become more accommodating of gay and
lesbian claims to rights because of their greater acquaintance with
homosexuals. 12 The authors wrote that Justice Harry Blackmun ac-
knowledged continuing affection for a clerk following her disclosure
to the Justice that she was a lesbian.13 There was also a report that
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg gave a gift to a lesbian former clerk on
the occasion of the clerk's commitment ceremony. 14 The authors also
report Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a note of sympathy to a
gay court employee upon the death of the employee's same-sex
partner. 15
10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
11. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 528 (1994).
12. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE
SUPREME COURT (2001). See generally Donald H.J. Hermann, Homosexuality and the High
Court.- A Review of Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme Court, 51 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1215-24 (2002).
13. MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 12, at 415-16.
14. Id. at 421.
15. Id. at 418.
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There is, however, evidence of the Court's reluctance to deal with a
claim to an interest in private sexual activity, both in relation to the
Constitution, as well as in relation to non-constitutional issues, when
the Court can alternatively identify a more traditional liberty interest,
such as an interest in procreation. The Court was faced with such a
situation in 1994 in its opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott where the Court
considered whether asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes a disabil-
ity under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 16 The Court
was required to determine whether asymptomatic HIV infection met
the three-prong definition of disability under the ADA by determin-
ing whether an HIV-infected individual had (1) a physical or mental
impairment; (2) whether the impairment adversely affected a major
life activity; and (3) whether the impairment substantially limited her
ability to engage in the particular activity. 17 Finding that HIV infec-
tion constitutes a physical impairment, the Court reasoned that since
the plaintiff was a woman of child-bearing age, and because HIV in-
fection presented a danger to a sexual partner and to any child con-
ceived by an HIV-infected woman, HIV adversely affected the
woman's ability to engage in reproduction. 18 The Court concluded
that "[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are cen-
tral to the life process itself."' 19
The Court did not decide that sexual activity itself is a major life
activity of a person that is limited by the presence of HIV infection.
There is significance to the Court's focus on procreation rather than
sexual activity itself. HIV-infected persons who are gay men, meno-
pausal women, men who have had a vasectomy, women who have had
a hysterectomy, and persons who are otherwise sterile all may be
faced with the need to identify some other major life activity in order
to establish that they are disabled within the terms of the ADA. The
significance of the Court's focus on reproduction or procreational sex,
rather than sexual intimacy per se is underscored by the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice William Rehnquist.20 The Chief Justice found
there was no evidence in the record that prior to becoming infected
with HIV the plaintiff's major life activities included reproduction.
According to the Chief Justice: "There is absolutely no evidence that,
absent the HIV, respondent would have had or was even considering
16. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (construing the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990).
17. Id. at 631 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12, 102(2) (1994)).
18. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-40.
19. Id. at 638.
20. Id. at 657 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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having children. '2 1 One explanation for the Court's decision was that
it was viewed more acceptable to base its opinion on a traditionalist
view that sex should be linked to procreation and, therefore, repro-
duction was preferable to sexual intimacy per se as the major life ac-
tivity to establish the plaintiff as HIV-disabled.
There is another significant aspect of the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence on the right of privacy: The Court's rejection of a developed
body of law based on substantive due process in its pre-1937 opinions,
which had culminated in striking down significant New Deal economic
legislation.22 The Supreme Court previously had held there was a sub-
stantive feature to the Due Process Clause that empowered it to strike
down statutes that were purely arbitrary or that unduly trenched upon
fundamental rights.23 In 1937, the Court abandoned the use of sub-
stantive due process as a basis for striking down economic legislation
in NLRB v. Jones L. Laughlin Steel Corp.24 In this case, the Supreme
Court refused to exercise independent judgment using a substantive
due process analysis when it upheld legislation regulating labor rela-
tions. Instead, the Court deferred to the findings of Congress that the
regulated activities had a substantial economic effect and rested on a
rational basis.2 5
Despite the abandonment of substantive due process in evaluating
the constitutionality of economic legislation, in 1938, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,26 indicated that it
might nevertheless invoke substantive due process in dealing with is-
sues involving specific constitutional guarantees or disadvantaged mi-
nority groups.2 7 In footnote four to his opinion in Carolene Products,
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone suggested that there could be a stronger
21. Id. at 659 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
22. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating a state law
establishing minimum wages for women as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state may
not generally prohibit private agreements to work more than a specified number of hours be-
cause the general right to contract in business is part of the individual liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
23. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause includes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, to establish a home, or to bring up children).
24. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
25. Id. at 41.
26. 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (rejecting a due process challenge to a federal prohibition of interstate
shipment of skimmed milk mixed with non-milk fats (filled milk)).
27. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
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case for judicial intervention in regulations dealing with personal mat-
ters rather than commercial transactions.
28
In 1942, the Supreme Court first considered an issue of rights re-
lated to sex in Skinner v. Oklahoma.29 The Court struck down a stat-
ute authorizing sterilization of some convicts, finding the statute used
a system of arbitrary classification of convicts. 30 The Court reasoned
that strict scrutiny of a sterilization statute was necessary to avoid in-
vidious discrimination involving a basic personal right, namely procre-
ation. The Court viewed the statute as implicating "one of the basic
civil rights of man."'3 ' According to the Court,
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects .... There is no redemp-
tion for the individual whom the law touches. He is forever de-
prived of a basic liberty .... [Sjtrict scrutiny of the classification
which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwit-
tingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against
groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guar-
anty of just and equal laws.32
The opinion in Skinner initiated a body of case law that largely ad-
dressed the issue of rights to sexual intimacy by limiting it to a right to
engage in procreational sex: "[A] right which is basic to the perpetua-
tion of a race-the right to have offspring. ' 33 This linkage formed a
significant basis for the Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick where
the Court opined:
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in those
cases [including Skinner and the other cases discussed in this Arti-
cle] bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this
case. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on
the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated .... )34
The Bowers opinion goes on to state unequivocally: "[A]ny claim that
these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of pri-
28. Id. ("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced with the Fourteenth [Amendment].").
29. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
30. Id. at 540-41.
31. Id. at 541.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 536.
34. 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
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vate sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insu-
lated from state proscription is unsupportable.'35
III. THE RIGHT TO CONTRACEPTION AND
NON-PROCREATIONAL SEX
In this Article, I reexamine the opinions cited in the Bowers opinion
to reveal that many of these opinions, in fact, protect a right of non-
procreational sexual intimacy between consenting adults rather than
marriage and procreation. This discussion supports the conclusion of
the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas that "Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. ' 36
A. The Birth Control Movement, Anti-Contraceptive Legislation,
and Judicial Abstention
The development of a constitutional right to sexual privacy arose
within the context of birth control and the Planned Parenthood move-
ment.37 Initial efforts to suppress the distribution of contraceptives
and birth control information were made by applying Comstock laws,
including a number of state and federal obscenity statutes prohibiting
distribution of contraceptive information and materials.38 Margaret
Sanger, a leader of the birth control movement, was convicted in 1916
of violating a state statute that limited physicians in providing contra-
ceptives; they could only provide contraceptives to prevent or cure
disease. A New York appeals court affirmed Sanger's conviction, in-
terpreting the statute as limited to permitting physicians to treat dis-
ease, rather than pertaining to others giving advice about
contraception to individuals, irrespective of their medical condition.39
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Sanger v. People.40
Physicians continued to litigate to remove obstacles to access birth
control information and devices. In 1936, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in United States v. One Package41
that Congress had not intended to bar importation of diaphragms by
doctors because a physician's goal of promoting health or saving lives
was not immoral and, therefore, fell outside the subject matter of the
35. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
36. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
37. See infra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
38. Comstock Law, 17 Stat. 598 (1873).
39. People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637, 637-38 (N.Y. 1918).
40. 118 N.E. 637, appeal dismissed, 251 U.S. 537 (1919) (per curiam).
41. 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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federal Comstock law.42 One Package removed the final obstacle lim-
iting private physicians' access to birth control information materials
in interstate commerce.
43
In 1879, Connecticut, as eventually many states did, adopted legisla-
tion prohibiting the use of birth control devices. 44 However, by 1960
Connecticut and Massachusetts were the only states with statutes ban-
ning contraceptives without providing a physician exception. 45 When
faced with challenges to the constitutionality of Connecticut's statute
prohibiting the use of drugs or instruments to prevent conception, and
the giving of assistance or counsel in their use, the Supreme Court
initially avoided considering the issue by invoking principles of jus-
ticiability. The subject of justiciability in federal courts is addressed
by Article III of the Constitution, which restricts the Court's jurisdic-
tion to cases and controversies. 46 The Court itself has developed rules
to insure adversarial presentation of cases to the Court and to guaran-
tee that the Court will operate within its appropriate role of deciding
adversarial cases within the structure of the federal government.
47 In
Tileston v. Ullman,48 the Court considered the appeal of a physician
who alleged that if the state's anti-contraceptive statute was applicable
to him, the statute would prevent the physician from giving profes-
sional advice concerning the use of contraceptives to three patients
whose health condition was such that their lives would be endangered
by childbearing.49 The Court found the physician lacked standing to
attack the constitutionality of the statute since there was no allegation
or proof that the physician's life was in danger, and since the patients,
who could have asserted such danger, were not parties to the proceed-
ing. According to the Court, the physician did not have standing to
secure the adjudication of the patients' constitutional right to life since
the patients were not themselves making any claim on their own be-
42. Id.
43. See CAROLE MCCANN, BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 1916-1946, at
75 (1994).
44. Conn. Acts 1879, § 78; see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). See generally DAVID
KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1970) (providing general historical information on
contraceptive devices).
45. See Jack H. Hudson, Birth Control Legislation, 9 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 255
(1960); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969), providing: "Any person who
uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days or more than one year or
be both fined and imprisoned."
46. U.S. CONsT. art. III; see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
47. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
48. 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
49. Id.
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half.50 The Court's finding that the physician petitioner lacked stand-
ing helped the Court to avoid a highly charged sexual issue.
The Supreme Court continued to invoke procedural dodges to
avoid confronting the issue of a right to contraception in its 1961 deci-
sion in Poe v. Ullman.51 Despite the declaration by a state prosecutor
that he intended to prosecute any physician who provided contracep-
tives to a patient who sought contraception to avoid pregnancies, the
Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of Connecticut's anti-
contraceptive statute. The patients who were parties to the suit al-
leged that possible childbearing posed health threats to some of the
prospective mothers and threatened the likelihood of giving birth to
severely disabled neonates by another prospective mother. Justice Fe-
lix Frankfurter, writing for the Court, affirmed dismissal of the case
because of lack of justiciability by finding the parties' lacked immedi-
acy of prosecutorial threat.52 The opinion of the Court underscores
that the issue was framed in terms of the availability of contraceptives
to married couples where pregnancy would constitute a serious threat
to the health or life of the female spouse. The opinion makes no men-
tion of the relevance of contraception to facilitating nonprocreative
sexual intimacy.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice William Douglas was dismissive of
the Court's strategy to avoid dealing with the issues raised by the
case.53 Justice Douglas wrote: "These cases are dismissed because a
majority of the members of this Court conclude, for varying reasons,
that this controversy does not present a justiciable question. That
conclusion is too transparent to require an extended reply."' 54 The sug-
gestion implicit in Justice Douglas's remark was that the Court wanted
to avoid dealing with a highly charged issue involving sex. Justice
Douglas found the threat of prosecution real with a resultant chilling
effect on physicians' willingness to provide contraceptive information
and materials. This threat of prosecution, according to Justice Doug-
las, should have moved the Court to confront the question of whether
the Connecticut anti-contraceptive law "as applied to this married
couple deprives them of 'liberty' without due process of law."' 55 While
Justice Douglas noted the health or medical concerns of the plaintiffs
in this case, he suggested a broader issue of an interest of married
50. Id. at 46.
51. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
52. Id. at 501.
53. Id. at 509-10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 515 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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partners to engage in nonprocreative sexual intimacy. According to
Justice Douglas: "The regulation as applied in this case touches the
relationship between man and wife. It reaches into the intimacies of
the marriage relationship.
56
Justice Harlan in his dissent maintained that the Court's refusal to
rule on the constitutionality of the state anti-contraceptive statute
"does violence to established concepts of 'justiciability,' and unjustifi-
ably leaves these appellants under the threat of unconstitutional pros-
ecution."' 57 As indicated earlier in this Article, Justice Harlan viewed
the case as limited "to the use of contraceptives by married per-
sons."'58 Justice Harlan, however, did not see the issue of contracep-
tives as limited to health concerns but suggested that the issue of
sexual relations was at stake when he wrote: "I believe that a statute
making it a criminal offense for married couples to use contraceptives
is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of
the most intimate concerns of an individual's personal life."
' 59 Justice
Harlan observed the reason given by the state for barring contracep-
tives was primarily a moral objection to contraception similar to the
state's justification for an anti-sodomy statute in Bowers and Law-
rence, resting primarily on moral condemnation of homosexuality.
60
Justice Harlan noted the state claimed to be acting to protect the
moral welfare of its citizens, both directly in that it considered the
practice of contraception immoral in itself, and instrumentally, in that
the availability of contraceptive materials tended to minimize "'the
disastrous consequence of dissolute action,' that is fornication and
adultery. '61
Nevertheless, Justice Harlan maintained that the moral judgment of
the state alone could not justify the restriction on use of contraception
by married couples. According to Justice Harlan, "[T]he mere asser-
tion that the action of the State finds justification in the controversial
realm of morals cannot justify alone any and every restriction it im-
56. Id. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. Poe, 367 U.S. at 522-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 523 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
59. Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
60. Compare id. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986) (Respondent "insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality
should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of
some 25 states should be invalidated on this basis."), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577
("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... " (quoting
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
61. Poe, 367 U.S. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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poses."' 62 While arguing for recognition of a fundamental right to en-
gage in marital sexual intimacy, Justice Harlan maintained that any
claim to a right of sexual intimacy was properly limited to married
couples. Justice Harlan explicitly rejected extending recognition of a
right to sexual intimacy to consenting adults in private:
Indeed to attempt a line between public behavior and that which is
purely consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community
concern a range of subjects with which every society in civilized
times has found it necessary to deal. The laws regarding marriage
which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the
legal and societal context in which children are born and brought
up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual
practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining
sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into
the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in
this area must build upon that basis.63
Writing for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy wrote
that a half century of laws and traditions "show an emerging aware-
ness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in decid-
ing how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 64
Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in Poe, provided the first ex-
plicit recognition of a liberty interest in sexual intimacy, albeit he lim-
ited that liberty interest to persons within marriage. 65
B. Constitutional Protection of Marital Sexual Intimacy
In Griswold v. Connecticut,66 decided in 1965, the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates a constitutional right of privacy that pro-
tects marital sexual intimacy from regulation by a state anti-contra-
ceptive statute.67 The Justices used three different approaches of
constitutional analysis to establish a basis for protecting marital sexual
intimacy in Griswold. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas found
that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that create zones of privacy,
thus protecting marital sexual intimacy from unjustified state interven-
tion.68 Justice Douglas went on to find that sexual intimacy in mar-
riage is protected by the right of privacy:
62. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
65. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. See generally id.
68. Id. at 484. Justice Douglas stated:
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We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights ....
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully en-
during, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an associa-
tion that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.69
Thus, Justice Douglas found protection within the right of privacy for
marriage, which necessarily includes protection of marital sexual inti-
macy. It took the Court another seven years before it considered
whether the protection of sexual intimacy extended to unmarried
partners.70
Justice Arthur Goldberg concurred in Griswold, finding that the
concept of liberty was incorporated into the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and protects those personal rights that
are fundamental. 71 Justice Goldberg maintained that beyond the spe-
cific terms of the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment provides addi-
tional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement,
which exist alongside the fundamental rights specifically identified in
the first eight constitutional amendments. 72 Justice Goldberg went on
to identify a right of privacy that is included in the Ninth Amendment,
which extends to marital sexual intimacy: "The entire fabric of the
Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guaran-
tees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and
raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental
rights specifically protected. '73 Justice Goldberg went on to deter-
mine whether Connecticut's anti-contraceptive law, as applied to
preventing dissemination of information and materials for contracep-
tives to married persons, constituted a reasonable regulation of sexual
intimacy. Justice Goldberg concluded that the state did not show the
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in
its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace with-
out the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which govern-
ment may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment pro-
vides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Id.
69. Id. at 486.
70. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
71. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 486-88 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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statute served any subordinating compelling state interest or was nec-
essary to accompany a permissible state policy.74 Justice Goldberg
proceeded to show the inadequacy of the state's proffered justification
for its anti-contraceptive statute as applied:
The State, at most, argues that there is some rational relation be-
tween this statute and what is admittedly a legitimate subject of
state concern-the discouraging of extra-marital relations. It says
that preventing the use of birth-control devices by married persons
helps prevent the indulgence by some in such extra-marital rela-
tions. The rationality of this justification is dubious, particularly in
light of the admitted widespread availability to all persons in the
State of Connecticut, unmarried as well as married, of birth-control
devices for the prevention of disease, as distinguished from the pre-
vention of contraception. But, in any event, it is clear that the state
interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be served by a more dis-
criminately tailored statute, which does not, like the present one,
sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to
be dealt with and intruding upon the privacy of all married
couples. 75
It is clear that Justice Goldberg viewed that the protected right to sex-
ual intimacy was based on its centrality to marriage and that he did
not anticipate any extension of the protection to sexual relations
outside marriage or between same-sex partners. Justice Goldberg
noted that "it should be said of the Court's holding today that it in no
way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity
or misconduct. '76
Justice Harlan, citing his own dissenting opinion in Poe,77 took the
view that "the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this
Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 78 Justice Byron White
stressed that the subject before the Court was the "regulation of the
intimacies of the marriage relationship. '79 However, instead of rest-
ing his analysis on an interest of married partners in nonprocreative
sex or recreational sex, Justice White stressed the fact that the statute
"forbids all married persons the right to use birth control devices, re-
gardless of whether their use is dictated by considerations of family
74. Id. at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
77. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (citing with approval his own Poe v. Ullman dissent).
78. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
79. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503 (White, J., concurring).
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planning ... health, or indeed even of life itself."80 Justice White also
found that the state did not give the reason for its adopting the anti-
contraceptive statute as an outright condemnation of contraception
per se but rather for the reason that such a statute would discourage
sexual relations outside of marriage. According to Justice White,
There is no serious contention that Connecticut thinks the use of
artificial or external methods of contraception immoral or unwise in
itself, or that the anti-use statute is founded upon any policy of pro-
moting population expansion. Rather, the statute is said to serve
the State's policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual
relationships, be they premarital or extramarital, concededly a per-
missible and legitimate legislative goal.8
1
While it is clear that Justice White found no constitutional obstacle to
state regulation of non-marital sexual intimacy, he found the anti-con-
traceptive statute an unreasonable legislative device for achieving the
state's proffered objective. Justice White concluded, "I wholly fail to
see how the ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples in
any way reinforces the State's ban on illicit sexual relationships.
812
Justice White suggested that there would be no constitutional objec-
tion to limiting an anti-contraceptive statute to persons engaging in
prohibited sexual relationships, namely sexual intimacies between un-
married persons.8 3
C. Recognition of the Right of Unmarried Persons and Minors to
Birth Control
Despite the clear linkage of constitutional protection of sexual inti-
macy to married couples within a right of privacy, the Court, in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird84 removed any necessary linkage of protected sexual
intimacy with marriage.8 5 Without equivocation, Justice William
Brennan declared, "If under Griswold the distribution of contracep-
tives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to
unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. '' 86 In Eisenstadt,
a non-physician, who was convicted of providing contraceptive mate-
rial to a woman, challenged the constitutionality of the Massachusetts
anti-contraceptive law.8 7 The Massachusetts statute provided that
80. Id. (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 505 (White, J., concurring).
82. Id. (White, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 507 (White, J., concurring).
84. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 453.
87. Id. at 440.
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married persons could obtain contraceptives from a physician or drug-
gist by prescription to prevent pregnancy, while unmarried persons
could not obtain contraceptives from anyone to prevent pregnancy.88
Justice Brennan acknowledged that in Griswold the right of privacy in
question was found to be within the marriage relationship.8 9 Never-
theless, Justice Brennan stated that whatever the rights of an individ-
ual to access contraceptives, that right is the same for the unmarried
as well as for the married individual. 90 According to Justice Brennan,
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an indepen-
dent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.91
There is, however, something seemingly disingenuous about stating
the question involving the interest of the two unmarried individuals as
involving a "decision whether to bear or beget a child."' 92 A more
accurate statement of the interest of the two unmarried individuals is
to engage in sexual relations without the likelihood of begetting a
child.
Justice Brennan made a more persuasive point when he invoked an
equal protection analysis.93 Implicit in Justice Brennan's analysis is
the view that Griswold established the right of privacy protecting sex-
ual intimacy under the Due Process Clause, including sexual intimacy
in marriage, from state regulation by an anti-contraceptive statute.
According to Justice Brennan, "[I]f Griswold is no bar to a prohibition
on the distribution of contraceptives, the State could not, consistently
with the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried
88. Id. at 440-41. The statute
under which Baird was convicted, provides a maximum five-year term of imprisonment
for "whoever... gives away ... any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for
the prevention of conception," except as authorized in § 21A. Under § 21A, [a] regis-
tered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles
intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. [And a] registered pharmacist
actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any
married person presenting a prescription from a registered physician.
Id. at 441 (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21).
89. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 453.
93. Id. at 454.
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but not to married persons. '94 He thought the evil perceived by the
state would be identical for married and unmarried persons, regard-
less of the justifications brought forward by the state for the anti-con-
traceptive statute, which included serving as a deterrent to fornication,
as a health measure, or because contraceptives per se were considered
immoral. 95 Justice Brennan concluded that by providing dissimilar
treatment for married and unmarried people, Massachusetts's anti-
contraceptive statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.
96
The question arises whether the opinions in Griswold and Eisen-
stadt can be reconciled. One begins with the fact that Griswold was
decided by interpreting the Due Process Clause, while Eisenstadt was
based on an application of the Equal Protection Clause. 97 Next, it is
necessary to determine how to characterize the question addressed by
the Court in Griswold. Two alternative questions can be developed
from the opinions: (1) Is there a marital right to engage in sexual rela-
tions free from state regulations by a state anti-contraceptive law; or
(2) is there a right of an individual to engage in acts of sexual intimacy
that includes married persons? Justice Brennan adopted the latter
reading of Griswold as establishing that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects a liberty interest in privacy, which includes sexual intimacy.
Given the justifications proffered by the state that such regulation is
either a per se objection to contraception or a measure to discourage
fornication, Justice Brennan then applied an equal protection analysis
and found no relevant difference between married and unmarried per-
sons insofar as their right to sexual intimacy is limited by a state anti-
contraceptive law. Any moral objection to contraception per se was
applicable to all persons using contraceptive materials, whether mar-
ried or not. The statute was not reasonably related to its proffered
purpose since both married and unmarried individuals are capable of
engaging in fornication using contraceptives to prevent conception.
There is a parallel in the way the Supreme Court initially dealt with
the question of state regulation of sodomy and the way the Court
dealt with the succession of cases involving anti-contraceptive statutes.
The Court in Bowers formulated the issue before it as whether the
Due Process Clause confers upon homosexuals a right to engage in
94. Id.
95. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454.
96. Id. at 454-55.
97. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. 481 ("[W]e are met with a wide range of
questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."), with Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 ("[W]e hold that the statute, viewed as a prohibition on contra-
ception per se, violates the rights of single persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
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sodomy.98 Effectively the Bowers Court merged a due process inquiry
with an equal protection analysis as did the Griswold opinion. In
Griswold it was "contraception use during sex by married persons" 99
and in Bowers it was "sodomy as a sexual practice by homosexu-
als."' 00 The Court in Eisenstadt interpreted Griswold to establish a
right to sexual intimacy free from regulation by anti-contraceptive
law, which it thus determined was available to unmarried persons as
well as married persons. The Court in Lawrence, its second opinion
dealing with sodomy, found that the proper formulation of the ques-
tion before the Bowers Court was whether there was a protected right
to sexual intimacy (including sodomy), which the Court in Lawrence
found extended to homosexuals as well as heterosexuals. 101
A significant factor in the recasting of Griswold was the Court's
decision in a non-sexual case, Stanley v. Georgia,l0 2 decided in 1969
after its decision in Griswold in 1965, and before its decision in Eisen-
stadt, which was decided in 1972.10 3 A parallel situation exists in the
reformulation of the issue raised by criminal prosecution of homosex-
ual sodomy into a right by homosexuals to engage in sodomy in Bow-
ers, and further still, into an issue of a right to engage in acts of sexual
intimacy including homosexual sodomy in Lawrence after the non-sex-
ual decision in Romer v. Evans.10 4 Romer held that equal protection
prohibited adoption of a state constitutional amendment that prohib-
ited the state and any of its agencies or subdivisions from adopting an
anti-discrimination ordinance protecting homosexuals because, among
other reasons, such a measure targeted a discrete minority on the ba-
sis of animus toward that minority.10 5
98. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) ("The issue presented is whether the Fed-
eral Constitution['s Due Process Clause] confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy.").
99. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
100. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
101. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("Their right to liberty under the Due Pro-
cess Clause gives them [homosexuals] the full right to engage in their [private sexual] conduct
without intervention of the government.").
102. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
103. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. 479.
104. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. The Court held unconstitutional the 1992 Amendment 2 to the
Colorado Constitution, which provided in part:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt
or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
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In Stanley, the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibited making mere private possession of obscene material
a crime. 10 6 The Court found the material, seized during a search of a
private home, consisted of obscene films that were not protected by
the First Amendment. Nevertheless the Court observed,
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas .... This right to receive informa-
tion and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to
our free society. Moreover, in the context of this case-a prosecu-
tion for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy
of a person's own home-that right takes on an added dimension.
For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusion into one's
privacy. 107
While Stanley involved possession (and use) of obscene material in the
home, the fact that the Court explicitly cited Griswold in its Stanley
opinion suggests a recognition that at least some aspects of sexual ac-
tivity, for example use of contraceptives in the home, merits protec-
tion under the Constitution from government regulation.108 In Stanley
the Court observed: "Whatever may be the justifications for other
statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the pri-
vacy of one's own home."' 0 9 There is a clear relationship between the
Court's opinion in Eisenstadt and its analysis in Stanley: While the reg-
ulation of the sale and public distribution of obscene materials is justi-
fied, crime and punishment for private possession of obscene
materials or regulation of obscenity in the privacy of the home is un-
constitutional because it violates the constitutional right to privacy.
The Court in Eisenstadt cited Stanley for the proposition that the right
of privacy precludes government regulation limiting access and use of
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Id. at 624 (citing COLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 306).
106. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
107. Id. at 564 (citations omitted). The majority quoted Justice Brandeis:
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pur-
suit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satis-
factions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized man."
Id. (quoting Olmsted v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
108. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
109. Id. at 565.
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contraceptives because such regulation constitutes an unwarranted
government intrusion into matters of private sexual intimacy.1 10
D. Judicial Awareness of Possible Implications of
Contraception Decisions
The decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,"' finding a
state statute unconstitutional that limited abortion to life-saving pro-
cedures on behalf of a mother, reflects the Court's recognition of a
protected interest in "decisional" interests related to sexual activity.112
When this is considered in relation to protection of "spatial" interests,
such as protection of the home at stake in Stanley, there is a basis for
subsequent determination of a right or protected interest in private or
intimate sexual activity. It is clear that the Court itself was not cogni-
zant of the full implications of its decisions involving contraception
and abortion for the ultimate recognition that the right of privacy im-
plicates a right or liberty interest in sexual intimacy. This was illus-
trated by dicta in the Court's decision in Carey v. Population Services
International,1 3 decided in 1977, holding a statute unconstitutional
that prohibited distribution of contraceptives to minors in furtherance
of a state policy against promiscuous sexual intercourse among mi-
nors.' 14 In footnote seventeen to the Court's opinion, Justice Brennan
wrote,
Appellees argue that the State's policy to discourage sexual activ-
ity of minors is itself unconstitutional, for the reason that the right
to privacy comprehends a right of minors as well as adults to engage
in private consensual sexual behavior. We observe that the Court
has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating such
behavior among adults. 15
This statement is significant in two ways. It clearly indicates that while
a retrospective reading of the Court's contraceptive and abortion
opinions reveals an implicit recognition of a protected interest in sex-
ual intimacy, the Court was not willing to give explicit recognition to
such a right, at least until Lawrence. It is equally clear that over
twenty-five years before its decision in Lawrence, the Court was aware
110. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564).
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. Id. at 153. ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is ... broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
113. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 694 n.17.
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that its contraception and abortion decisions provided the basis for a
plausible claim to a right to engage in private consensual sexual
behavior.
The Court in Carey viewed the right of privacy to be one aspect of
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and this right of personal privacy was found to include
"'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions."'116 At the same time the Court recognized that "the outer
limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court."'
117
The Court referred to earlier opinions that recognized the specific
right to make personal "decisions that an individual may make with-
out unjustified government interference," including "decisions relat-
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationship, and
child rearing and education."" 8 The Court went on to state that it
was dealing with "a field that by definition concerned the most inti-
mate of human activities and relationships," apparently referring to
sexual relations generally, and more specifically, sexual intercourse.
The Court made clear that "decisions whether to accomplish or to pre-
vent conception are among the most private and sensitive."' 19
The Court in Carey noted that state officials attempted to formulate
the issue before the Court in the narrowest of terms. According to the
Court's opinion, "Appellants argue that this Court has not accorded a
'right of access to contraceptives' the status of a fundamental aspect of
personal liberty."' 20 The Court formulated the issue more broadly as
a right to decide whether "to bear or beget a child.' 12 1 According to
the Court: "the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects
individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unqualified intru-
116. Id. at 684 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 685 (citations omitted). The Court cited the following cases: Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (education, including the right to teach one's children a foreign lan-
guage); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and education); Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(marriage); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453, 454 (1972) (contraception): Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 at 152-53 (1973) (abortion); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-40 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave rules).
119. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
120. Id. at 686.
121. Id. at 687 ("the underlying premise of those decisions that the Constitution protects 'the
right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into . . . the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."' (alteration in original) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438. 453 (1972))).
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sion by the state."'1 22 This formulation implicitly raises the issue of
whether there is a right to decide to engage in non-procreational sex-
ual intercourse. The Court reasons that "[r]estrictions on the distribu-
tion of contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to make such
decisions."'1 23 The Court in Carey was not, however, prepared to rec-
ognize a right to sexual intimacy. So like Homer in the Illiad steering
between Scylla and Charybdis, the Court attempted to avoid both too
narrow a formulation of the right at stake ("not because there is an
independent fundamental 'right of access to contraceptives,' but be-
cause such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally pro-
tected right of decision in matters of childbearing") 124 and in avoiding
too broad a formulation of the right, the Court was not yet prepared
to recognize the right to engage in private, consensual sex ("the Court
has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [pri-
vate, consensual sexual] behavior among adults."). 125
The Court went on to address the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to people under sixteen
years of age.126 The Court identified the reason for enacting the stat-
ute to be the state's goal of regulating the morality of minors by dis-
couraging promiscuous sexual intercourse among minors. 127 The
Court cited its decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,128 holding the state could not require parental consent as a
condition for a minor obtaining an abortion, as establishing that "the
right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation ex-
tends to minors as well as to adults. ' 129 The Court discounted the
state's asserted justification for the anti-contraceptive statute, noting
the trial court's finding that "there is no evidence that teenage extra-
marital sexual activity increases in proportion to the availability of
contraceptives.' 130 The Court concluded the anti-contraceptive stat-
122. Id. ("This intrusion into 'the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms' made [the anticon-
traception] statute particularly 'repulsive"' (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965))).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 688.
125. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689 n.5 (alteration in original).
126. Id. at 691-92.
127. Id. at 692.
128. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
129. Id. at 693 (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(holding that a State "may not impose a blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent
or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12
weeks of her pregnancy")).
130. Id. at 695 (citing Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 332 n.10 (S.D.N.Y.
1975)).
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ute burdened the exercise of a fundamental right and that the state
failed to establish the statute was a rational means for accomplishing
its policy of discouraging minors' promiscuous sex.
IV. THE RIGHT TO ABORTION AND AVOIDING THE
CONSEQUENCES OF SEXUAL RELATIONS
In 1973, the Supreme Court took the bold step of extending the
right of privacy from its decisions finding a right of access to contra-
ception in Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird, to a right
to abortion in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. These cases held that
the right of privacy recognized in its prior cases was "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy.' 131 The Court further held that, because a woman's right to
decide whether to end a pregnancy is fundamental, only a compelling
interest could justify any state regulation. 132
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that a Texas criminal abortion stat-
ute that proscribed procuring or attempting an abortion, except on
medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life, was uncon-
stitutional.133 The Court held that during the first trimester of a preg-
nancy, a state may require only that an abortion be performed by a
licensed physician, but no further regulation was justified. 134 After
the first trimester, the Roe Court held that a compelling state interest
in the mother's health permits reasonable regulations in order to per-
form such abortions.135 After the fetus is viable 136 (usually at seven
months or twenty-eight weeks, but which may occur as early as
twenty-four weeks) the state has a compelling interest in the life of the
131. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 186 (1973) (citing
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). Doe, a companion case to Roe v. Wade, cited
earlier cases supporting the assertion that the basis for finding a right to decisional freedom
involving sexual intimacy was implicit in earlier contraception decisions. See also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
132. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
133. Id. at 118 n.1. The Court cited Texas Penal Code Articles 1191-1194 and 1196, which
provide in part:
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure
to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any
violence or means whatever, externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an
abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five
years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled.
Id. at 117-18 n.1 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191).
134. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163, 165.
135. Id. at 163.
136. See WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2518 (Philip Grove ed., 1981) ("A viable
fetus has attained such form and development of organs as to be normally capable of living
outside the fetus, this normally occurs at seven months or twenty-eight weeks.").
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fetus so the state may prescribe abortion during the third trimester
except when necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. 137
The Court in Roe recognized that a person's desire to establish a
right to abortion could be linked to a woman's desire to engage in
sexual intimacy in marriage.138 Without a right to abortion a woman
could face the possibility of pregnancy if contraception failed. Thus,
without a right to an abortion, a woman's ability to engage in sexual
relations was burdened with the possibility of pregnancy, which posed
a health danger to some women.1 39 However, the Court was unwilling
to grant standing to plaintiffs who sought review based on possible
future contraceptive failure or pregnancy. 140 The Court limited its
consideration to a direct attack on the Texas statute by a pregnant
woman who claimed a right to terminate her pregnancy.1 41 The Court
concluded that "the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough
to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not abso-
lute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state
interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal
life, become dominant.' 142 The Court in Thornburgh v. America Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,143 which dealt with informed
consent regulation of abortion, linked the right of abortion to other
"personal and intimate" rights arguably implicating a right to engage
in acts of sexual intimacy. 144 The Court in Thornburgh opined,
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies apromise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be
kept largely beyond the reach of government .... Few decisions are
more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision ...
whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that
choice freely is fundamental.1 45
The Court in Roe explicitly dealt with a woman's right to abortion;
consequently, the Court found no new reason to frame the question of
abortion in terms of a right to engage in sexual relations unburdened
by state regulation. Nevertheless, the Court's decision in Roe impli-
cated a woman's right to engage in sexual intimacy since the purpose
of abortion is to avoid the consequence of sexual intercourse, namely
137. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150, 163-64.
138. Id. at 128.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 128-29.
141. Id. at 129.
142. Id. at 155.
143. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
144. Id. at 772.
145. Id. (citations omitted).
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pregnancy, which has occurred as a result of conception following a
lack or failure of contraception.
In Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that a woman's right to
choose to have an abortion was part of a fundamental right to privacy,
and that the state can only limit this liberty interest by establishing
that any regulation promotes a state interest of compelling impor-
tance.146 Nineteen years after its decision in Roe, the Court decided
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,'147 in
which a majority of Justices reaffirmed the ruling of Roe that recog-
nized a woman's fundamental right to choose to abort a nonviable
fetus.1 48 Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority, found that a
woman's right to choose to have an abortion of a nonviable fetus is
grounded in the concept of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 149 The Court reaffirmed the
essential holding of Roe on the basis of an independent analysis of the
concept of liberty and on the basis of stare decisis. 150 Justice
O'Connor wrote for the Court:
It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe's essential
holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a recogni-
tion of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State
.... Second is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict abor-
tions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health. And third
is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset
of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life
of the fetus .... 151
Justice O'Connor linked the right to choose an abortion with other
concerns involving personal and intimate choices: "These matters, in-
volving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are cen-
tral to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 152 Deci-
sions about personal sexual intimacy easily can be linked, not only
functionally, but also as a matter of choice defining personal identity.
In the language of the Court, decisions about sexual intimacy are like
"the abortion decision[, which] may originate within the zone of con-
146. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
147. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
148. See generally id.
149. Id. at 846-47.
150. Id. at 853.
151. Id. at 846.
152. Id. at 851.
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science and belief."'1 53 The Court opined, "It should be recognized,
moreover, that in some critical respects the abortion decision is of the
same character as the decision to use contraception, to which Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Carey v. Population Ser-
vices International afford constitutional protection.' 1 54
The Court consciously linked the right to choose an abortion to the
liberty interest in intimate relationships, of which personal sexual inti-
macy must be a quintessential interest. According to Justice
O'Connor, "Roe is clearly in no jeopardy, since subsequent constitu-
tional development have neither disturbed, nor do they threaten to
diminish, the scope of recognized protection accorded to the liberty
relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about
whether or not to beget or bear a child."'1 55 The Court consciously
linked the decision to abort to the desire to engage in nonprocrea-
tional sex "when the woman confronts the reality that, perhaps de-
spite her attempts to avoid it, she has become pregnant. ' 156
V. SODOMY AND THE RIGHT TO SEXUAL INTIMACY
A. Is There a Right To Engage in Homosexual Sodomy?
The Supreme Court's Bowers opinion now can be viewed as an
anomaly or a departure from the body of cases already discussed. 157
It can also be viewed as a tentative answer to the question posed by
the Court in its opinion in Carey, where Justice Brennan stated, "We
observe that the Court has not definitely answered the difficult ques-
tion whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state stat-
utes regulating [private, consensual sexual] behavior among
adults."'1 58 However, the Bowers opinion, which only indirectly an-
swered the question of whether there is a liberty interest in private,
consensual, sexual behavior, found constitutional a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy. In holding that the Constitution does not con-
fer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, 159 the
majority in Bowers avoided the broader question of whether there is a
fundamental right to engage in acts of private, consensual, sexual inti-
153. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 857 (emphasis added) (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 437 U.S. 678 (1977);
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
156. Id. at 853.
157. See id.
158. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977).
159. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
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macy. Instead, the Court formulated, as narrowly as possible, the
question in the following terms: "The issue presented is whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals
to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very
long time. ' 160 The Court chose this narrow formulation despite the
fact that the Georgia statute did not limit the proscription of sodomy
to homosexual sodomy, but rather the statute applied to heterosexuals
and homosexuals alike. 16' The Georgia statute provided in part: "A
person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another. 1 62 In a footnote the Court noted that in
addition to the defendant, Hardwick, who was charged with a viola-
tion of the statute based on an act of same sex-sodomy, a heterosexual
couple sought to challenge the statute based on their desire to engage
in sodomy. 163 The Court sustained the trial court's finding that the
heterosexual couple lacked standing because they were in no immedi-
ate danger of prosecution. 64 As a consequence, the Court decided it
need only consider Hardwick's challenge to the statute as applied to
consensual homosexual sodomy and need express "no opinion on the
constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other [heterosex-
ual] acts of sodomy."'165
The Supreme Court also avoided the broader question, formulated
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which
held that "the Georgia statute violated respondent's fundamental
rights because his homosexual activity is a private and intimate associ-
ation that is beyond the reach of state regulation by reason of the
Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 66 The majority in Bowers rejected the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's analysis of the prior Supreme Court decisions, which the Elev-
enth Circuit viewed as dealing with childbearing, procreation,
marriage, conception, and abortion, that taken together could be con-
strued properly "to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosex-
ual sodomy. ' 167 The Court in Bowers also rejected an analysis that
construed these earlier Court decisions as implicating a more general
160. Id. at 190.
161. Id. at 188 n.1.
162. Id. (citing GA CODE. ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
163. Id. at 188 n.2.
164. Id.
165. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
166. Id. at 189 (citing Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985)).
167. Id. at 190-91.
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right to sexual intimacy from which a right to engage in sodomy by
homosexuals could be derived. 168 The Court reasoned,
We think it evident that none of the rights announced in those casesbears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homo-
sexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the onehand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated,
either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent. Moreover, any
claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is
constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
unsupportable.169
The majority cited Carey for the proposition that the right of privacy
does not include a right of adults to engage in consensual acts.170 Ac-
cording to the majority in Bowers, "the Court's opinion in Carey twice
asserted that the privacy right, which the Griswold line of cases found
to be one of the protections provided by the Due Process Clause, did
not reach so far."' 171 Despite the Court's unqualified statement about
the text of Carey, a careful reading of the opinion reveals that the
Court did not make such an assertion. Rather, the opinion is clear in
its view that the question remained open whether the right of privacy
included a right of adults to engage in acts of consensual intimacy.
The Carey opinion states "the Court has not definitively answered the
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohib-
its state statutes regulating [private, consensual, sexual] behavior
among adults, and we do not purport to answer that question now."'172
And later in the Carey opinion, the majority emphasizes: "We ob-
serve that the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes
regulating such [sexual] behavior among adults.1 73 It is clear that the
majority in Bowers took the view that there is no protected right of
adults to engage in private, consensual, sexual acts. The Court clearly
rejected a possible interpretation that the Griswold line of cases
sought to establish such a right of sexual intimacy. Such an interpreta-
168. Id. at 190.
169. Id. at 190-91.
170. Id. at 191.
171. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 694
n.17 (1977)).
172. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5 (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
173. Id. at 694 n.17 (emphasis added).
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tion was what the Eleventh Circuit did in its Bowers opinion,'174 and
what the Supreme Court ultimately did in Lawrence v. Texas.
175
The majority in Bowers decided, independent of precedent, that
there existed no basis for finding "a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy.' 1 76 The Court found proscription of homosex-
ual sodomy had ancient roots, including the fact that sodomy was a
common law crime at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified and a
crime in most states when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted.1 77 The Court explicitly rejected a claim that the opinion in
Stanley provided protection for sexual conduct occurring in the home,
even if such conduct could otherwise be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion.178 According to the Court, the decision in Stanley was rooted in
the First Amendment and provided no support for a claim that con-
sensual sexual conduct, which was otherwise criminal, was immunized
when it occurred in the home. 79 The Court reasoned that victimless
crimes, such as possession and use of controlled substances, can be
criminally prosecuted despite the fact that such conduct occurs in the
home. 180 The Court concluded that even "if respondent's submission
is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults,
it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homo-
sexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest,
and other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the
home."' 181 This same concern was expressed by Justice Antonin Scalia
in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence.'82 The Court concluded in
Bowers that because it failed to find any fundamental right at issue,
the Georgia criminal sodomy statute would necessarily be constitu-
tional if the state asserted a reasonable or rational basis for the stat-
ute.183 The Court concluded that the legislature's finding that
174. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
175. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (finding "an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex").
176. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
177. Id. at 192-93.
178. Id. at 195 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.ll (1969)).
181. Id. at 195-96.
182. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's dissent argued:
"State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation
of laws based on moral choices." Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
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homosexual sodomy is immoral provided an adequate rationale to
support the criminal sodomy statute. 184
B. Posing the Question Raised by Criminalization of Sodomy
Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion in Bowers, rejected the
Court's formulation of the right at stake as a "fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy." 185 Instead, he asserted that the
proper formulation was "the right [of individuals] to decide for them-
selves whether to engage in particular forms of private, consensual
sexual activity."'1 86 Justice Blackmun asserted that the values underly-
ing the constitutional right to privacy protected the most intimate as-
pects of an individual's life, including the right of intimate association
that extends to private, consensual, sexual activity, and including the
right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy. 18 7 Justice Black-
mun suggested the right to sexual intimacy implicated two lines of
Court opinions, one dealing with decisional privacy and the other
dealing with "spatial aspects of the right to privacy."1 88 The first line
of cases recognized a privacy interest with references to decisions that
are properly made by individuals.189 The second line of cases recog-
nized a privacy interest with reference to places such as the home.1 90
A right to sexual intimacy includes the right to engage in sexual acts in
private places, including the home.
Justice Blackmun faulted the majority for confining its analysis of
previous Court precedents to the narrow reading of the language of
the holdings in the opinions examined, rather than considering the un-
derlying interests or values at stake in the precedents being re-
viewed. 91 According to Justice Blackmun,
While it is true that these cases may be characterized by their con-
nection to protection of the family ... the Court's conclusion that
they extend no further than this boundary ignores the warning...
against "clos[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights
associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." We protect those
184. Id.
185. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189 (majority opinion), with Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
190. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)).
191. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way,
to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a
part of an individual's life. "[T]he concept of privacy embodies the
'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to
society as a whole." 192
This analysis led Justice Blackmun to view the decision striking down
the state anti-contraceptive law in Griswold as an opinion not con-
cerned with demographic considerations, but with an individual's self-
definition. 193 Similarly, decisions regarding family are important be-
cause they affect individual happiness rather than supporting stere-
otypical households.1 94 According to Justice Blackmun, "sexual
intimacy is 'a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to
family life, community welfare, and the development of human per-
sonality."' 195 Justice Blackmun went on to recognize that different
decisions in expressions of sexual intimacy are not only protected by
the Constitution but are to be expected and valued. Justice Blackmun
wrote,
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a
Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of
conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose
the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.1
96
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court's fail-
ure to recognize a particular form of sexual intimacy has significance
for the protection of the right of other non-homosexuals in their ex-
pression of sexual intimacy. According to Justice Blackmun: "The
Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fun-
damental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court re-
ally has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals
have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with
others.' 97
In exploring the Court's precedents recognizing a right to protec-
tion of private places such as protection for conduct occurring in the
192. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
193. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
194. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06
(1977)).
195. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63
(1973)).
196. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Associa-
tion, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637 (1980); Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Roe v. Wade.
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
197. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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home, Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court's reading of the
meaning of Stanley was unconvincing and erroneous. 198 Justice Black-
mun observed that the majority viewed Stanley as based on the First
Amendment while disregarding its Fourth Amendment basis.1 99 It
was the fact that the material seized in Stanley was seized from within
the home that the Court protected possession of obscene material that
was otherwise subject to being banned or seized because it did not
have the protection of the First Amendment. Justice Blackmun cited
the quotation in Stanley from Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in
Olmstead v. United States200 asserting recognition of the individual's
"right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of
his own home. 201 This led Justice Blackmun to conclude that "the
right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy
of his or her own home seems to me to be in the heart of the Constitu-
tion's protection of privacy. 202
C. Recognition of a Right to Sexual Intimacy
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Bowers not only provided a
critique of the majority's opinion, but the opinion also provided a
blueprint for the Court's ultimate recognition of the right to sexual
intimacy. 20 3 In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
noted that "Justice Stevens'[s] analysis, in our view, should have been
controlling in Bowers. °20 4 According to Justice Stevens the line of
cases from Griswold to .Carey not only implicated a right to sexual
intimacy but also established the right to sexual intimacy that is cen-
tral to the liberty from which the right of privacy is derived. 205 Justice
Stevens wrote: "The essential 'liberty' that animated the development
of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt and Carey surely em-
braces the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that
198. Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
199. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The citation of
Stanley by Justice Blackmun suggests the relevance to the ultimate recognition of a right to
sexual intimacy of the Court's earlier recognition of protection of activity in private places such
as the home and, as significantly, the reference to Olmstead suggests the relation of a protection
of privacy and satisfaction of emotional needs including sexual intimacy, which was implicit in
the Court's earlier privacy opinion.
202. Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
205. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217, 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
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others may consider offensive or immoral. ' 20 6 Justice Stevens main-
tained that heterosexuals and homosexuals have the same interest in
sexual intimacy. 207 Since the Georgia statute proscribed sodomy inde-
pendent of the sexual orientation of the individuals engaged in the
conduct, Justice Stevens asserted the purpose of the statute was to
condemn sodomy as immoral, not to judge the morality of homosexu-
ality. 208 Moreover, since Georgia had not enforced the sodomy stat-
ute, even against homosexuals engaged in the conduct, for Justice
Stevens the record of nonenforcement established the lack of signifi-
cance of such an underlying moral judgment of sodomy, which argua-
bly might provide a rational basis for the statute as a regulation of
sexual intimacy.20 9
Seventeen years after issuing its opinion in Bowers, the Court over-
ruled that decision, holding in Lawrence that a Texas statute making it
a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual
conduct, denominated "deviate sexual intercourse," and violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 210 In Lawrence
the Court used an analysis that inquired whether there was a reasona-
ble or rational basis for the criminal statute authorizing prosecution of
individuals for engaging in same-sex sodomy, and concluded that no
legitimate state interest supported a restriction on private sexual activ-
ity between two consenting adults in private that did not cause physi-
cal or mental harm to either of the participating parties.21' Thus, the
majority found no need to determine whether sexual intimacy, includ-
ing sexual activity between unmarried persons or persons of the same
sex, involved a fundamental right since the statute did not survive ra-
tional basis review, obviating the need to apply a strict scrutiny
analysis.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy began his analysis with the
premise that liberty protected by the Due Process Clause protected
personal autonomy that includes freedom to engage in certain inti-
mate conduct.212 Justice Kennedy concluded that a statute criminaliz-
ing sex between two persons of the same sex is not supported by a
rational state interest that would justify limiting the exercise of free-
dom to engage in private consensual acts of sexual intimacy.213 In
206. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 219-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-79, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
211. Id. at 567-73.
212. Id. at 562.
213. Id. at 567.
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reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy placed heavy emphasis on
the Court's Griswold decision.214 According to Kennedy's analysis,
Griswold should be understood as establishing a protected interest in
a right to privacy, which initially emphasized protection of the mar-
riage relationship and protected the space of the marital bedroom. 215
The Court's decision in Eisenstadt was recognized by Justice Kennedy
as establishing that the right to make certain decisions regarding sex-
ual conduct extended beyond that marital relationship to all adults,
whether married or unmarried.2 16 Justice Kennedy then considered
the significance of the Roe abortion rights decision as recognizing the
right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her
destiny, thus confirming that the protections of liberty under the Due
Process Clause have a "substantive dimension of fundamental signifi-
cance" in defining the rights of the person. 217 The decision in Carey,
which struck down a law prohibiting the sale or distribution of contra-
ceptives to persons under the age of sixteen confirmed, according to
Justice Kennedy, that the protections at issue in the line of cases con-
sidered relevant were not limited to the protection of married adults
to engage in nonprocreative sexual relations.218
Justice Kennedy criticized the Bowers opinion for formulating the
issue as merely the right to engage in specified sexual conduct, namely
homosexual sodomy. 219 According to Justice Kennedy,
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
purport to do more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their pen-
alties and purpose, though, have more far reaching consequences,
touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior,
and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to for-
mal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals. 220
Justice Kennedy concluded that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expres-
sion in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make this choice. '221
214. Id. at 564 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
215. Id. at 564-65 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
216. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
217. Id. at 565 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
218. Id. at 566 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
219. Id. at 566-67 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
220. Id. at 567.
221. Id.
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Justice Kennedy next examined whether there was some exception
to the right of sexual intimacy that would justify exclusion of homo-
sexual sodomy. An extensive examination of historical writing led to
the conclusion that there is no longstanding history of laws specifically
criminalizing homosexual sodomy.222 Justice Kennedy's account
found that laws specifically targeting homosexual sodomy were not
enacted until the 1970s.2 2 3 In addition, Justice Kennedy noted that the
Model Penal Code, promulgated in 1955, recommended elimination
of criminal penalties for consensual relations conducted in private.
224
There was also a trend in the states to repeal general sodomy statutes.
In 1961, all fifty states had criminal provisions dealing with sodomy,
but by 1986 only twenty-four states had sodomy statutes.225 By the
time the Court decided Lawrence, only eleven states had laws
criminalizing sodomy.2 26 This history led Justice Kennedy to conclude
there was "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial pro-
222. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-70.
223. Id. at 570 ("It was not until the 1970's that any state singled out same-sex relations for
criminal prosecution, and only nine States have done so. See 1977 Ark. Gen. Acts no. 838; 1983
Kan. Sess. Laws p. 652; 1974 Ky. Acts p. 847; 1977 Mo. Laws p. 687; 1973 Mont. Laws p. 1339;
1977 Nev. Stats. p. 1632; 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 591; 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399; see also Post
v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (sodomy law invalidated as applied to different
sex couples)").
224. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. Justice Kennedy discussed the Model Penal Code:
In 1955 the American Law Institute promulgated the Model Penal Code and made
clear that it did not recommend or provide for 'criminal penalties for consensual sexual
relations conducted in private.' ALI, Model Penal Code § 213.2, Comment 2, p. 372
(1980). It justified its decision on three grounds: (1) The prohibitions undermined re-
spect for the law by penalizing conduct many people engaged in; (2) the statutes regu-
lated private conduct not harmful to others; and (3) the laws were arbitrarily enforced
and thus invited the danger of blackmail. ALI, Model Penal Code, Commentary 277-80
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Id.
225. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
226. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-63 (1975) (sodomy law in effect applied against both heterosex-
ual and homosexual sodomy); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.01 (West 2000) (sodomy law in effect ap-
plied both to opposite- and same-sex acts); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (2004) (sodomy law in effect
applied to both opposite- and same-sex acts); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995) (statute
criminalized only same-sex acts); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (2004) (sodomy statute applied to
both opposite- and same-sex acts, upheld in State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501 (La. 2000)); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972) (sodomy law applied to both opposite- and same-sex acts); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2003) (sodomy law applied to both opposite- and same-sex acts; statute
found constitutional in State v. Poe, 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 886 (2002) (sodomy law in effect as to same-sex acts; invalidated as applied to different sex
couples by Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120
(2003) (sodomy law applied to both opposite- and same-sex acts); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.06 (2003) (sodomy law applied to both opposite- and same-sex acts); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.1 (1950) (sodomy law applied to both opposite- and same-sex acts).
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tection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
in matters pertaining to sex."'227
D. Criticism of Substantive Due Process as the Basis for a Right to
Sexual Intimacy
Justice Kennedy went on to discuss the erosion of Bowers. First, he
examined the Court's own decision in Casey, an abortion case, which
Justice Kennedy asserted "confirmed that our laws and tradition of-
fered constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education. '228 The second decision, Romer v. Evans, struck down
class-based legislation directed at homosexuals because it violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Kennedy believed the decision had
direct significance for the claim that homosexuals engaging in sodomy
were protected, as well as heterosexuals, from criminal prosecution. 229
Just as in Romer a criminal statute directed at homosexual sodomy
could be viewed as "born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected" and as "having no rational relation to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. ' '230 Justice O'Connor concurred in Lawrence on just
this point, that the Texas homosexual sodomy statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause.231 Nevertheless the majority in Lawrence
refused to base its decision on the Equal Protection Clause because
the majority viewed the question before the Court as involving the
broader question of a right to sexual intimacy guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause.232 According to Justice Kennedy, "were we to hold
the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently,
say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex
participants. '233 Instead, the Court ruled that all persons have a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest in their acts of sexual intimacy.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Scalia not only criticized the
willingness of the Court to overrule Bowers despite stare decisis, but
also he maintained that the Griswold line of cases neither implicated
nor established a right of adults to sexual intimacy. 234 According to
Justice Scalia, the Court in Lawrence erroneously established a right
227. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
228. Id. at 573-74 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
229. Id. at 574-75 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
230. Id. at 574 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
231. Id. at 579-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 574-75.
233. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
234. Id. at 586, 594-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to sexual intimacy by using a substantive due process analysis from a
reading of the Griswold line of cases.2 35 Justice Scalia read Griswold
as expressly disclaiming reliance on the doctrine of substantive due
process and grounded his opinion in what he called "the so-called
'right to privacy' in penumbras of constitutional provision other than
the Due Process Clause. '236 Eisenstadt, according to Justice Scalia,
was based on an equal protection analysis and had nothing to do with
substantive due process, although he does acknowledge Eisenstadt
contains significant reference to the right of privacy established in
Griswold.2 37 Roe, according to Justice Scalia, was based on a substan-
tive due process analysis resulting in the finding that the right to abor-
tion was a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.
2 38
However, Justice Scalia maintained that the holding in Roe had been
eroded by the decision in Casey because the latter's holding that regu-
lations of abortion narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est meant that the Court rejected by logical implication the finding
that the right to abortion was a fundamental right.
239
Justice Scalia's reading of the Griswold line of cases ignored the fact
that all of these cases involve the recognition of rights not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution and which necessarily involved a type
of "substantive due process" analysis. It is important to remember
that in Griswold, various approaches were put forth to establish a
right to contraception by married couples, including not only Justice
Douglas's opinion for the Court based on a right of privacy, but also
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion using a straightforward substan-
tive due process analysis, and Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion
relying on the Ninth Amendment.240 It is important to recall that
these opinions were written in the aftermath of the Court's rejection
of a substantive due process analysis of economic regulations and the
Carolene Products doctrine, which suggested a greater justification for
constitutional protection from state regulation of individual rights
protected by the Constitution.2 4' As to the Court's opinion in Roe,
Justice Scalia completely ignored the statement in the majority opin-
ion that links the right to abortion to a right of privacy. Justice Black-
mun wrote that
235. Id. at 594-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
237. Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)).
238. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)).
239. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
240. See supra notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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[t]his right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate pregnancy. 242
Not only does the Court's opinion in Roe establish the right to abor-
tion in the right of privacy, but Justice Blackmun also acknowledged
that the right is not absolute and is subject to regulation. Again, Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote: "We, therefore, conclude that the right of per-
sonal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests
in regulation. ' 243 Justice Scalia's ideologically based assertion that the
decision in Casey eroded the Roe decision and, therefore eroded the
right to abortion established by Roe did not square with the actual
language of the Court's opinion in Roe no matter how many times he
termed the right to abort a fetus which is not viable as "the right to
abort an unborn child." Justice Scalia's reading of Casey simply did
not square with the actual language of the Court in Casey. Justice
O'Connor was perfectly clear when she wrote, "we are led to conclude
this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once
again reaffirmed. '2 44
Justice Scalia not only criticized the reading of Griswold and its
progeny, but also rejected the claim that these cases provide the basis
for a claim that there is an implicit right to sexual intimacy that has
become apparent as the various opinions of the Court have shown
over time.245 Justice Scalia dismissively quotes the majority opinion in
Lawrence where Justice Kennedy wrote: "[W]e think that our laws
and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.
These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 246 Justice Scalia's criticism is
two-fold; first he asserts that "'an emerging awareness' does not es-
tablish a fundamental right. '247 It seems, however, that Justice Scalia
misconstrues the meaning of Justice Kennedy's statement. The major-
ity is not claiming that the Court is recognizing a new right to sexual
242. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
243. Id. at 154.
244. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
245. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 597-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
571-72).
247. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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intimacy because of an awareness that Americans have become more
sexually permissive. The claim of the majority more correctly seems
to be that implicit in the specific decisions involving assertion of a
right to engage in specific conduct, the Court repeatedly has found
implicit that there is a protection of individuals' right to sexual inti-
macy. The Court merely has "pulled the fig leaf off" the right of
privacy.
Justice Scalia's second claim was that the statement of the Court
about an emerging awareness of a right to sexual intimacy is incorrect
because "[s]tates continue to prosecute all sorts of crimes by adults 'in
matters pertaining to sex': prostitution, adult incest, adultery, obscen-
ity, and child pornography. 2 48 Justice Scalia seemed to assert that if
there is any regulation of sexual conduct, there can be no basis for a
claim of a right to engage in sexual conduct. But of course no consti-
tutional right is absolute, not even freedom of speech. As Justice
Harlan wrote in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,49 "we reject
the view that freedom of speech and association ... as protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are absolutes. '250 Neither is
the right to sexual intimacy absolute; the question is whether a statu-
tory regulation of sexual intimacy is legitimate in that it is a reasona-
ble or rational regulation necessary to achieve some valid stated
purpose and narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose. The Lawrence
majority found no reasonable basis for the state's criminal punishment
of homosexual sodomy. 251 Justice Scalia, however, would uphold state
regulation of sexual conduct when "society's belief that certain forms
of sexual behavior are 'immoral and unacceptable.'1
2 52
Justice Scalia's opinion is most significant for its critique of the lan-
guage and analysis of the Court's opinion in Lawrence as a precedent
for determining the significance of the asserted right of "adult persons
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex."' 25 3 In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia correctly noted that
the Court does not denominate the right to sexual intimacy to be a
fundamental right. In his terms, "nowhere does the Court's opinion
declare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the
248. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
250. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (citation omitted).
251. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (stating that "the fact that the governing majority in a State
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice" (citation omitted)).
252. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 572, 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Due Process Clause. ' 254 Nor does the Court choose to apply strict
scrutiny to determine whether the Texas criminal sodomy statute as
applied is constitutional. Justice Scalia maintains the Court would
have "subject[ed] the Texas law to the standard of review that would
be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy [or sexual inti-
macy] were a 'fundamental right."' 255 What the Court does is estab-
lish a liberty interest in sexual intimacy and evaluates a state sodomy
statute as a regulation of the right of sexual intimacy against a rational
or reasonable basis and finds the state's justification insufficient to jus-
tify the regulation. Justice Scalia describes this process dismissively:
"[T]he Court simply describes petitioners' conduct as 'an exercise of
their liberty' . . . and proceeds to apply an unheard-form of rational-
basis review. ' 256 What the Court actually does is recognize a right to
sexual intimacy and determines that a state criminal sodomy statute
limiting that liberty interest is not a reasonable regulation on the
state's mere justification of the law as necessary to preserve commu-
nity morality.
Justice Scalia's critique of Lawrence has already been significant for
how the right established by Lawrence has been understood by courts
faced with the question of whether specific conduct is included in or
protected by the right of sexual intimacy. Justice Scalia's critique is
important because of the way the Court itself previously suggested the
process by which it would approach claims of liberty protected by sub-
stantive due process. The Court articulated the framework to be used
for determining substantive due process clause rights in Glucksberg ,257
where the Court declined to find a right to physician-assisted sui-
cide. 258 Justice Scalia quotes Glucksberg for the proposition that
"only fundamental rights which are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition' qualify for anything other than rational-basis scru-
tiny under the doctrine of 'substantive due process."' 259 Justice Scalia
suggested the failure to specifically state that the right to sexual inti-
macy established in Lawrence is a fundamental right should be viewed
as significant by other courts when construing any claim based on a
right of sexual privacy. Justice Scalia suggested that lower courts limit
their review of any statute or regulation of sexual conduct to a deter-
mination based on whether the state has asserted a reasonable or ra-
254. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
258. Id. at 728.
259. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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tional basis for the statute at issue, and not subject any statutes
regulating sexual privacy to strict scrutiny.
One should first recall the language of the Court in Lawrence sug-
gesting the right to sexual intimacy had great significance. Recall that
Justice Kennedy stated there was "an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to con-
duct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 260 Further, the
majority in Lawrence cites the Court's earlier opinion in Casey, as not
only conflicting with Bowers, but also supporting the Court's holding
in Lawrence.261 The Court quotes Casey for the proposition that
"'[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'1, 262 The Court in Lawrence also found that "[e]quality
of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important
respects. '263 In deciding that the right to sexual intimacy includes
"sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle" the Court fur-
ther states, "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their conduct without the intervention of
the government.
'264
Justice Scalia is correct in his statement that the majority in Law-
rence did not apply strict scrutiny to the Texas sodomy statute.265 The
reason, however, is not because the Court failed to find the right to
sexual intimacy to be a fundamental right. The reason is there was no
need to apply strict scrutiny because the Court found no valid justifi-
cation for the Texas statute. In the Court's words, "The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual. '2 66 The Court's deci-
sion to strike down the Texas sodomy statute should be viewed as
more compelling because after the Court fully considered the reason
given for the enactment by the legislature of Texas, the Court found
260. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
261. Id. at 574-75 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1972)).
262. Id. at 574 (emphasis added) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
263. Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 578 (emphasis added). The Court goes on to quote Casey with approval: "'It is a
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may
not enter."' Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (emphasis added)).
265. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[N]or does [the Court] subject the
Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual
sodomy were a 'fundamental right."' (emphasis added)).
266. Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
"no legitimate state interest" to justify the Texas criminal sodomy
statute.267
A close reading of Glucksberg suggests that Justice Scalia may have
overemphasized the need to include the term "fundamental right" for
the Court to establish that its recognition of a right to sexual intimacy
has the full significance of other rights protected by substantive due
process guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. The Court in Gluck-
sberg stated, "The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair pro-
cess, and the 'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of
physical restraint." 268 The Glucksberg opinion goes on to cite a num-
ber of cases recognizing "certain fundamental rights" and liberties, in-
cluding the very cases the Court in Lawrence cited as the basis for
establishing a right of adults to decide how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex. 269 The Court's opinion cites a num-
ber of cases recognizing specific rights in which the right to sexual
intimacy is implicit:
In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specificfreedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty" specially pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Lov-ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v.Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) . . . to marital
privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to use contra-
ception; ibid.; ... and to abortion, Casey, supra.270
Rather than being at odds with Glucksberg, the Court's opinion in
Lawrence drew on the line of cases from Griswold to Casey, which
evidences the very type of substantive due process analysis suggested
by Glucksberg. The majority opinion in Glucksberg, written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, recommends an analytic approach for determining
whether a claimed liberty interest or right is encompassed by substan-
tive due process:
In our view, however, the development of this Court's substantive-
due-process jurisprudence... has been a process whereby the out-lines of the "liberty" specially protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-never fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable ofbeing fully clarified-have at least been carefully refined by con-
crete examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply
rooted in our legal tradition. This approach tends to reign in the
subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judi-
267. Id.
268. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (The "Due Process Clause 'protects
individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedure
used to implement them."' (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))).
269. Id. at 720.
270. Id.
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cial review. In addition, by establishing a threshold requirement-
that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right-before
requiring a more than reasonable relation to a legitimate state inter-
est to justify the action, it avoids the need for complex balancing of
competing interests in every case.
271
The Court in Lawrence carefully considered the Griswold to Casey
line of cases finding them to be "concrete examples involving funda-
mental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition. '2
72 The
Court in Lawrence maintained "[t]here are broad statements of the
substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause in earlier
cases ... the most pertinent beginning point is our decision in Gris-
wold. ' 273 Lawrence's finding that, "liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat-
ters pertaining to sex" was derived from Griswold, where Justice
Douglas concluded "[w]e deal with a right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. '2 74 Justice Douglas's final words in Griswold are strong sup-
port for the claim that the right to sexual intimacy was "so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.
27 5
VI. CONSTRUING THE RIGHT TO SEXUAL INTIMACY
A. Pre-Lawrence Challenges to Limiting Access to Devices for
Sexual Stimulation
The Court in Lawrence determined that the protected right or lib-
erty interest of adults to engage in private sexual acts extends to indi-
viduals engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle,
such as sodomy.276 The question remains as to what extent the right
established in Lawrence extends to other sexual conduct. Justice
Scalia expressed concern that the reasoning of the majority in Law-
rence will extend protection to "bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult in-
cest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity. ' 277 A series of opinions from a federal district court in Al-
abama and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit provide an opportunity to observe how these courts have
271. Id. at 722 (citations omitted).
272. Id.
273. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
274. Id. at 572; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
275. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
276. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
277. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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considered claims based on a right to sexual intimacy and ultimately
how lower courts have construed the Court's opinion in Lawrence.278
These opinions consider constitutional challenges to the part of the
Alabama Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act that prohibits distribution
for any device primarily used for stimulation of human genitals.279
The first three opinions, captioned Williams v. Pryor were decided
while Bowers was controlling precedent.2 80 The most recent of these
opinions by the Eleventh Circuit was decided in 2004 after Lawrence
became controlling precedent. 281
In its first opinion, the federal district court found that vendors and
users of the sexual devices proscribed by the state had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Alabama statute.282 The plaintiff
vendors of sexual devices and novelties alleged fear of prosecution
and sought injunctive relief barring enforcement of the statute.2 83 The
other "user plaintiffs" asserted use of the sexual devices either for
therapeutic purposes related to sexual dysfunction or as an alternative
to sexual intercourse.284 The court noted that the sexual devices at
issue were used "to avoid the possibility of sexually transmitted dis-
eases... to better stimulate intimate relationships with partners. . . to
278. Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999), rev'd, Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d
944 (lth Cir. Ala. 2001), on remand, Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002),
rev'd and remanded, Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) rehearing,
rehearing en banc denied, Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
279. 1998 Ala. Acts. 98-467, § 6 (codified at Alabama Code § 13 -12-200.2(a)(1)), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to
distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or any device designed
or marketed as useful primarily for stimulation of human genital organs for anything of
pecuniary value. Material not otherwise obscene may be obscene under this section if
the distribution of the material, the offer to do so, or the possession with.the intent to
do so is a commercial exploitation of erotica for the sake of prurient appeal. Any
person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon correc-
tion, shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and
may be imprisoned in the county jail or sentenced to hard labor for the county for not
more than one year. A second or subsequent violation of this subsection is a Class C
felony if the second or subsequent violation occurs after a conviction has been obtained
for a previous violation. Upon a second violation, a corporation or business entity shall
be fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than fifty thousand dol-
lars ($50,000).
Id.
280. Bowers was decided in 1986. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The first federal
district decision in Williams v. Pryor was handed down in 1999; the first decision by the Eleventh
Circuit was decided in 2001. See supra note 278.
281. The second federal district court opinion was issued in 2002. Lawrence was decided in
2003. The second Eleventh Circuit opinion captioned Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Alabama
was issued in 2004. See supra notes 273, 278.
282. Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
283. Id. at 1260.
284. Id.
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achieve sexual satisfaction not otherwise available [to achieve] tempo-
rary or long-term sexual pleasure when a partner is not otherwise
available, and as part of therapy for sexual dysfunction and marital
problems. ' 285 One female plaintiff was a mature married woman who
used sexual devices of the type proscribed by the statute, with her
husband of twenty-five years, both to enhance their intimate relation-
ship and to assist her in overcoming orgasmic difficulties.
2 86
The plaintiffs in Williams asserted that enforcement of the Alabama
statute imposed an unduly heavy "burden on their fundamental rights
of privacy and personal autonomy guaranteed by the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. '28 7 According to the dis-
trict court, plaintiffs basically asserted that their right of privacy and
personal autonomy constituted a "liberty interest" protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 288 The district
court took the view that the plaintiffs did not seek recognition of a
fundamental right, but rather sought to extend the "right to privacy,"
which the Supreme Court had recognized as fundamental in certain
contexts. 289 According to the trial court, the plaintiffs framed the is-
sue as "whether the right of privacy is broad enough to encompass an
individual's decision to engage in private sexual activity not [properly]
proscribed by law."' 290 Of course this is ultimately what the Supreme
Court in Lawrence decided when it found "liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex. ' 291 The Attorney General of Ala-
bama, however, maintained that the question raised by the case was
"whether there is a constitutional right to obtain dildos, vibrators, and
other marital aids 'designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs."' 292 This formulation parallels
the way the Court posed the issue in Bowers, which the majority
faulted in Lawrence. The Lawrence Court noted the issue formulated
in Bowers was stated as follows: "'The issue presented is whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals
to engage in sodomy ....' That statement, we now conclude, discloses
the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of liberty at stake.
293
285. Id. at 1262-63.
286. Id. at 1264.
287. Id. at 1274.
288. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
289. Id. at 1275.
290. Id.
291. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
292. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
293. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190).
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The trial court in Williams came closer to a Lawrence-like formulation
of the issue when it stated: "This court must decide whether the con-
cept of a constitutionally protected 'right to privacy' protects an indi-
vidual's liberty to use devices 'designed or marketed as useful
primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs' when engaging
in lawful, private, sexual activity. '2 94
The trial court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a claim to a
fundamental right that would have compelled the court to subject the
Alabama statute to strict scrutiny.2 95 The trial court's opinion stated
that
this court refuses to extend the fundamental right of privacy to pro-
tect plaintiffs' interest in using devices 'designed or marketed as
useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs' when
engaging in lawful, private, sexual activity, and thereby impose a
strict scrutiny frame of analysis when reviewing the Alabama statute
at issue.296
The trial court then determined whether the Alabama statute survived
review under a rational basis test, requiring that the statute not be
"unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. ' 297 The trial court went on to
determine whether the Alabama statute served a legitimate govern-
ment interest and whether the statute had a rational relation to that
interest.2 98 The state's interest in morality was identified as a legiti-
294. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
295. Id. at 1284. The court noted:
Plaintiffs' most persuasive argument stems from the therapeutic and medical use
these devices have for individuals afflicted with some form of sexual dysfunction. The
argument presupposes the existence of a fundamental right to engage in lawful, private,
sexual activity. This premise inheres in the fact that secondary decisions, which flow
from the original decision to engage in sexual intercourse, are protected as fundamental
liberty interests: for example, the right to procreate, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); the right to use contraceptives, see e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); and the right to choose to have an abortion, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992). Thus, plaintiffs draw the conclusion that people who have a physi-
ological or psychological need to use sexual devices in order to perform sexually should
be accorded similar protection for this liberty interest as they and others are accorded
for the liberty interest in lawful, sexual intercourse.
Id.
296. Id. at 1284.
297. Id. at 1284-85. Applying the standard of review using a rational basis test as set out in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934), the Court held:
"[T]he Fourteenth [Amendment does] not prohibit governmental regulation for the
public welfare. [it] merely condition[s] the exertion of the admitted power by securing
that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the
guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."
Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)).
298. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1285-86.
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mate basis for the Alabama statute: "Alabama's interest in banning
'the commerce of sexual stimulation and autoeroticism, for its own
sake' is an interest tied to social morality.299 Implicit in a legislative
ban on the commerce of devices used for 'sexual stimulation and auto-
eroticism' is disapproval of the type of activity." 300 The trial court also
suggested that the state had an interest in its citizens not drawing the
conclusion that the state endorsed the use of sexual devices by failing
to proscribe them.30 1 It concluded that the state's interest in public
morality is directly connected to what is sold with the state's tacit ap-
proval; therefore, Alabama had a legitimate interest in prohibiting the
sale of sexual devices.
302
The trial court's opinion drew heavily on the Supreme Court opin-
ions of Carey and Bowers to support its conclusion that the Court had
not yet recognized a fundamental right to sexual privacy. The opinion
in Carey was central to the trial court's analysis. According to the trial
court: "The Supreme Court has clearly said that it has not yet decided
whether lawful, private, sexual conduct is sheltered from state inter-
ference by the Constitution." 30 3 The trial court acknowledged that de-
cisions such as Eisenstadt revealed an extension of the fundamental
right of privacy to interests in sexual intimacy. 30 4 The trial court rea-
soned that "nevertheless, these opinions generally have been narrowly
construed or discussed by the Court, for example, as protecting only
major life decisions such as decisions related to childbearing and child
rearing." 30 5 The trial court concluded that the Griswold to Casey line
of cases "does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
299. Id. at 1286-87.
300. Id. at 1287. The court also found the state had an "interest in shielding children and
,unwilling adults' from 'immoral,' obscene displays is a legitimate, constitutionally sound inter-
est." Id. However, the trial court found the interest was "not rationally related to the provision
at issue." Id. at 1288.
301. Id. at 1287. The court worried that
allowing the sale of these devices, which inherently implicate the state's regulatory
channels, is an implicit condonation of this activity. Furthermore, implicit state condo-
nation of certain conduct, which is created by the absence of state proscription, is likely
to give some semblance of approval by the general public. Without question, social
approval or disapproval, or the appearance of either, will affect the mores of a particu-
lar society.
Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1281. The trial court noted that "in Carey the court noted that it 'has not definitely
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state stat-
utes regulating (private consensual sexual) behavior among adults .... and we do not purport to
answer that question now."' Id. at 1281-82 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 689 n.5 (1977)).
304. Id. at 1282 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
305. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992)).
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important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected," includ-
ing decisions involving all aspects of sexual intimacy. 306
The most significant opinion influencing the trial court, however,
was the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers.30 7 The trial court cited
Bowers as rejecting the argument that the right of privacy encom-
passes all private sexual conduct.308 The trial court quoted Bowers as
establishing that the Supreme Court had not drawn from the privacy
line of cases an explicit recognition of a protected right to sexual inti-
macy. Justice White stated in Bowers that
any claim that these [fundamental right to privacy] cases ... stand
for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between
consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscrip-
tion is unsupportable. Indeed, the Court's opinion in Carey twice
asserted that the privacy right, which the Griswold line of cases
found to be one of the protections provided by the Due Process
Clause did not reach so far. .... 309
Now that Lawrence has overruled Bowers, the question is no longer
whether there is a right to sexual privacy, but rather, what specific
aspects of sexual privacy cannot be burdened by state regulation.
Notwithstanding the trial court's refusal to recognize a right to sex-
ual intimacy, the trial court went on to determine that the Alabama
statute banning the sale of sexual devices failed the "rational basis"
test required of any state law because the statute was not rationally
related to the state's legitimate interest in public morality, nor was it
narrowly drawn to achieve some legitimate state interest.310 The court
noted the parties to the litigation stipulated that the use of the sexual
devices by married couples served as an aid to marital relationships,
including sexual relations.311 The trial court found that "[b]anning
commerce of sexual devices is not rationally related to this end [of
protecting public morality], because such a ban inevitably interferes
with sexual stimulation and anti-eroticism which is related to mar-
riage, procreation, and familial relationships. '312 The trial court held
306. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997)).
307. Id. (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186).
308. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191).
309. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191).
310. Williams, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1293, overruled by 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
311. Id. at 1289-90. The trial court noted:
The court finds that the information above establishes that the sexual devices in issue
are used by married individuals to aid their marital relationships, and to facilitate or
enable sexual performance with their respective spouses. It follows that a ban on the
commerce of these devices interferes with "sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism"
which is related "to marriage, procreation[,] or familial relationships."
Id.
312. Id. at 1289.
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"that the prohibition on the distribution of sexual devices, found in
Alabama Code §13A-12-200.2(a)(1), bears no reasonable, rational re-
lation to a legitimate state interest and is, therefore, in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. '313
The Eleventh Circuit, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence, in a de novo review, reversed the trial court's decision.
314
The appellate court not only found the Alabama statute rationally
served the state's interest in public morality, but also found that the
trial court erred in invalidating the statute under minimal scrutiny.
315
The Eleventh Circuit held that the Alabama statute, which made it a
criminal offense to commercially distribute sexual devices, was ration-
ally related to the state's legitimate government interest in public
morality.316
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the trial court that no fundamen-
tal right was at issue and that the statute did not target a suspect class;
therefore, strict scrutiny of the statute was inappropriate.3 7 The
Eleventh Circuit went on to state that minimal scrutiny is a highly
deferential standard of review that limits only the outer boundaries of
legislative power.318 According to the Eleventh Circuit, "A statute is
constitutional under rational basis scrutiny so long as 'there is any rea-
sonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the' statute. '319
The Eleventh Circuit found the district court erred in finding the
statute lacked a rational basis,320 and held that the state's interest in
public morality is a legitimate interest and that the statute rationally
promoted that interest. 321 According to the Eleventh Circuit,
"A ban on the sale of sexual devices and related orgasm stimulating
paraphernalia is rationally related to a legitimate legislative interest
in discouraging prurient interests in autonomous sex" and that "it is
313. Id. at 1293.
314. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001).
315. Id. at 956.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 947-48.
318. Id. at 948.
319. Id. ("On rational-basis review, . . a statute ... comes to us bearing a strong presumption
of validity [of the statute], and those attacking the rationality of the [statute] have the burden to
negative every conceivable basis which might support it." (alteration in original) (quoting FCC v.
Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993))).
320. Williams, 240 F.3d at 949.
321. Id. ("The crafting and safeguarding of public morality has long been an established part
of the States' plenary police power to legislate and indisputably is a legitimate government inter-
est under rational basis scrutiny. A statute banning the commercial distribution of sexual
choices is rationally related to this interest." (citations omitted)).
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enough for a legislature to reasonably believe that commerce in the
pursuit of orgasms by artificial means for their own sake is detri-
mental to the health and morality of the State." The criminal pro-
scription on the distribution of sexual devices certainly is a rational
means for eliminating commerce in the devices which is itself a ra-
tional means for making the acquisition and use of the devices more
difficult.
32 2
This led the Eleventh Circuit to "hold the Alabama sexual devices
distribution criminal statute is constitutional under rational basis scru-
tiny because it is rationally related to at least one legitimate State in-
terest. ' 323 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the regulation of
public morality was at least one legitimate state interest justifying the
statute.324
The Eleventh Circuit went on to fault the trial court for not ade-
quately or fully considering the as-applied challenge to the Alabama
statute raised by the married women-plaintiffs who used sexual de-
vices with their husbands, and two divorced women who began using
sexual devices while married but were single at the time of the litiga-
tion. 325 The Eleventh Circuit stated that the statute likely was consti-
tutional as applied "to those who sell to minors sexual devices which
are deemed harmful to minors. '326 However, the Eleventh Circuit
found the as-applied challenges raised by the married and unmarried
plaintiffs arguably could implicate an interest in sexual privacy. 32 7
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for consideration of
"whether or to what extent the Alabama statute infringes a funda-
mental right to sexual privacy of the specific plaintiffs in [the] case. '328
The Eleventh Circuit went on to provide a relatively broad charge to
the trial court on remand to consider "whether our nation has a
deeply rooted history of state interference, or state non-interference,
in the private sexual activity of married or unmarried persons [or]
whether contemporary practice bolsters or undermines any such
history."329
It is significant to note that in his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia
cited this first opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in Williams as a reason
for not overruling Bowers, because of the Eleventh Circuit's reliance
on a state interest in public morality as a basis for upholding a state
322. Id. at 949-50 (citation omitted).
323. Id. at 950.
324. Id. at 951.




329. Id. at 955-56.
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statute's regulating sexual intimacy by limiting the distribution of sex-
ual devices. 330 Justice Scalia wrote that "[c]ountless judicial decisions
and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient proposition that
a governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral
and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation."'331 Jus-
tice Scalia went on to make specific reference to the Eleventh Circuit
opinion. 332 Justice Scalia failed to mention that notwithstanding the
Eleventh Circuit upholding the statute regulating the sale of sexual
devices on public morality grounds, the appeals court remanded the
case for a determination of whether there was a protected interest in
private sexual activity that made that statute unconstitutional because
it was not narrowly tailored to support the state's interest.
333
On remand, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama was more than willing to consider the question ap-
parently posed by the Eleventh Circuit of whether there is a
constitutionally protected interest in sexual intimacy. 334 As the trial
court considered plaintiffs as-applied constitutional challenges to the
Alabama statute, plaintiffs renewed their motion for summary judg-
ment asserting that the statute violated their constitutional right to
privacy.335 The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute; that the plaintiffs had a
constitutional right to privacy that encompassed sexual privacy of
married and unmarried persons including the right "to use sexual de-
vices within the confines [of] private, consensual, adult, sexual rela-
tionship[s;]" that the statute burdened the right of privacy; and that
the statute was "not narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling state
interest. "336
In its second opinion in the Williams case, the trial court effectively
anticipated the Supreme Court's opinion handed down nine months
later in Lawrence. In the second Williams opinion, the trial court
found that "plaintiffs have shown that the fundamental right of pri-
vacy, long-recognized by the Supreme Court as inherent among our
330. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Williams v.
Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001)).
331. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
332. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote: "See, e.g. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 949,
949 (C.A.11 2001) (citing Bowers in upholding Alabama's prohibition on the sale of sex toys on
the ground that '[t]he crafting and safeguarding of public morality.., indisputably is a legitimate
interest under rational basis scrutiny.'"). Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
333. See Williams, 240 F.3d at 955-56.
334. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (N.D. Ala. 2002), overruled by 240 F.3d 944
(11th Cir. 2001).
335. Id. at 1260-61.
336. Id. at 1300.
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constitutional protections, incorporates a right to sexual privacy. '337
The Supreme Court in Lawrence held petitioner's "right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in
their [private sexual] conduct without intervention of the
government." 338
On remand, the trial court found that the constitutional guarantees
that accompanied the plaintiffs' fundamental right of privacy pre-
vented Alabama from prohibiting adults from purchasing sexual de-
vices for use within their private, adult, consensual, sexual
relationships since the state failed to establish a compelling reason for
the statute.339 After an extensive review of recent writings on the his-
tory of sexuality in America from the colonial period to the present,
the trial court concluded that there was evidence of a substantial his-
tory, legal tradition, and contemporary practice of state non-interfer-
ence in private, consensual, sexual relationships of married and
unmarried adults. 340
The trial court next considered the relevance of the Supreme Court
opinions dealing with marriage, procreation, contraception, and abor-
tion.341 The trial court concluded that the Supreme Court's opinions,
supplemented with evidence from "history, legal tradition, and prac-
tice," led to the conclusion that "there exists a constitutionally inher-
ent right to sexual privacy that firmly encompasses state non-
337. Id. at 1259.
338. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
339. Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60.
340. Id. at 1277-91.
341. Id. at 1291-94. The trial court discussed Supreme Court cases and their holdings:
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), which recognized the "liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control," and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which also protected parental
control over education .... Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court ac-
knowledged procreation, "the right to have offspring" as "one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race." Id. at 536, 541 (overturning a state law that provided for sterilization for
criminals). Later twentieth century decisions of the Supreme Court confirmed: a right
to privacy in the body, see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (overturning state
criminal conviction for violation of due process where evidence was forcibly extracted
from defendant's mouth and stomach); the right to marital privacy, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (overturning state law forbidding use of contracep-
tives as unconstitutional); the right to marry, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(overturning Virginia antimiscegenation statute); the right to privacy as incorporating a
right to use contraceptives, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding uncon-
stitutional a state law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to single persons,
but not to married persons); and the right of privacy as incorporating a right to repro-
ductive choice, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (overturning state law that prohib-
ited abortion).
Id. at 1291-92.
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interference with private, adult, consensual sexual relationships. 342
The trial court suggested that the constitutional protection was not
limited to traditional procreative sex: "The court notes that this right
to sexual privacy cannot be limited to a mere right to 'sex,' when the
decisions of the Supreme Court protecting abortion, contraception,
and the right to privacy in our bodies are considered.
343
The trial court went on to determine whether the "fundamental
right of sexual privacy between married and unmarried adults in pri-
vate, consensual, sexual relationships encompasses a right to use sex-
ual devices like vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas.
344
The court found that sexual devices are used in intimate sexual acts
for medical, therapeutic, and sexual reasons. 345 The trial court took
special note that these devices can be used for masturbatory purposes
and that masturbation had never been a crime in any state.346 Moreo-
ver, the trial court found the use of sexual devices was intrinsic to the
sexual relationships for some people with spouses or other partners.
347
The court concluded that the "use of these sexual devices is an impor-
tant part of their sexual relationships and, consequently, is protected
by their right to sexual privacy. '348
The trial court then turned to a determination of whether the State
of Alabama justified its regulation of private sexual conduct by a regu-
lation prohibiting the sale of sexual devices.349 Since the trial court
found that the Alabama statute burdened a fundamental right, the
statute was subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that a "statute be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. '350
The trial court determined that there were two possible state interests
compelling a ban on the sale of sexual devices, including both an inter-
est in regulating obscenity and an interest in protecting public moral-
342. Id. at 1296.
343. Id.
344. Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1297.
348. Id. The trial court discussed how
[a] statute solely prohibiting the sale of a product can nevertheless unconstitutionally
infringe on the rights inherent in the "zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees," because, in essence, a ban on the sale of these sexual de-
vices can amount to an impermissible burden on their use.
Id. at 1298 (citations omitted).
349. Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1299.
350. Id. at 1299-1300. The Court noted: "If the challenged law burdens a fundamental consti-
tutional right, then the law can survive only if the State demonstrates that the law advanced a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to meet that interest." Id. at 1300 (citing Eu v.
S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989)).
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ity.35t Nevertheless, the court concluded that "Alabama's total
prohibition of the distribution of sexual devices is not narrowly tai-
lored" to meet the state's suggested possible interests.352
B. Post-Lawrence Consideration of the Regulation and Sale of
Devices for Sexual Stimulation
The Eleventh Circuit, which issued its second opinion a year after
the Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence, reversed the trial court's
finding that the Alabama statute prohibiting commercial distribution
of sexual devices was unconstitutional.35 3 It is significant that the
Eleventh Circuit in Williams found that Lawrence did not provide a
controlling precedent establishing a right to sexual privacy.35 4 In-
stead, the appeals court held that there is no fundamental, substantive
right of consenting adults to engage in private intimate sexual conduct
that would trigger a strict scrutiny review of any statute burdening acts
of sexual intimacy. 355
The Eleventh Circuit recalled that in its initial opinion it had re-
versed the district court's conclusion that the Alabama statute lacked
a rational basis and held that promotion and preservation of public
morality provided a rational basis, but had remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration of an as-applied fundamental rights challenge.3 5 6
The Eleventh Circuit found itself reviewing a second district court de-
cision finding the statute unconstitutional based on the district court's
recognition, on remand, of a fundamental right to sexual privacy that
encompassed the right to use sexual devices. Moreover, the trial court
had determined the statute failed strict scrutiny.35 7
The Eleventh Circuit began its de novo review of the district court's
decision asserting that no opinion of the Supreme Court, including
that in Lawrence, provided a decisive recognition of a right to sexual
privacy. 358 The Eleventh Circuit invoked the dicta in Carey, written
sixteen years prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence, stat-
ing that the Court "has not definitely answered the difficult question
351. Id. at 1303-06.
352. Id. at 1305.
353. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
354. Id. at 1234-35 ("[W]e reaffirm our conclusion in Williams 11, 240 F.3d at 954, that no
Supreme Court precedents, including the recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), are decisions on the question of the existence of such a right.").
355. Id. at 1238 ("[W]e decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right to sexual
privacy triggering strict scrutiny.").
356. Id. at 1234.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1234-35 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
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whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes
regulating private consensual sexual behavior among adults. ' 3
59 The
Eleventh Circuit recognized that "many of the Court's 'privacy' deci-
sions have implicated sexual matters. ' 360 Nevertheless, they took the
view that not only did the Griswold to Casey line of cases not establish
a right to sexual privacy, but also concluded that the Supreme Court
in Lawrence had not answered the question posed in Carey because it
did not "recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy" or "a new
fundamental right to private sexual intimacy. ' 361 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit provided a narrow reading of the opinion in Lawrence:
Lawrence clearly established the unconstitutionality of criminal
prohibitions on consensual adult sodomy, "it is a strained and ulti-
mately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a
new fundamental right"-whether to homosexual sodomy specifi-
cally or, more broadly, to all forms of sexual intimacy.
362
359. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235-36 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688,
n.5 (1977)).
360. Id. at 1236 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptives)).
361. Id.
362. Id. (citing Lofton v. Sec. of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-17
(11th Cir. 2004)). Lofton upheld a Florida statute prohibiting homosexuals from adopting chil-
dren, where the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals initially provided a reading of Lawrence v.
Texas, concluding that the Supreme Court had not identified a new fundamental "right to sexual
intimacy" that could "be extrapolated to create a right to adopt for homosexual persons." Lof-
ton v. Sec. of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815, 817 (11th Cir. 2004). The
appeals court provided a constrained reading of the Lawrence opinion. According to the appeals
court:
Lawrence's holding was that substantive due process does not permit a state to impose
a criminal prohibition on private consensual homosexual conduct. The effect of this
holding was to establish a greater respect than previously existed in the law for the right
of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct.
Id. at 815 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). The court of appeals's reading of Lawrence seems
to invert the opinion deriving a right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct
from the Court's finding that the state was prohibiting from imposing a criminal sanctions on
consensual homosexual conduct. The Court's opinion in Lawrence actually reaches the opposite
conclusion by finding the right of homosexuals to engage in sexual "practices common to a ho-
mosexual lifestyle" is derived from the broader "protection [afforded] to adult persons in decid-
ing how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572,
578.
In Lofton, the court of appeals seemed to rely more on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion than
on the majority's opinion in Lawrence. The appeals court observed that "[n]owhere, however,
did the Court characterize this right as 'fundamental."' Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586)). The appeals court went on to observe that the
Court in Lawrence did not "locate this right directly in the Constitution, but instead treated it as
the by-product of several different constitutional principles and liberty interests." Id.
The Eleventh Circuit went on to consider whether the Court in Lawrence had met the require-
ments for recognition of a fundamental right under the substantive due process analysis set out
by the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720 (1997)). The court of appeals in Lofton found that "the Lawrence opinion contains virtually
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The Eleventh Circuit made two significant findings that effectively
limited the significance of Lawrence for determining whether statutes
burdening adult, private, consensual, sexual relations are constitu-
tional. The court found that Lawrence (1) "did not employ-funda-
mental-rights analysis" and (2) "ultimately applied rational-basis
review, rather than strict scrutiny, to the challenged statute. ' 363 The
Eleventh Circuit majority maintained that those arguing that Law-
rence recognized a substantive due process right of consenting adults
to engage in private intimate sexual conduct, such that all infringe-
ments of this right must be subjected to strict scrutiny, cannot identify
a specific holding to that effect in the Court's opinion in Lawrence,
but are compelled to rely on "scattered dicta from Lawrence" to es-
tablish a right to sexual intimacy. 364
The Eleventh Circuit rejected any claim that a right to sexual inti-
macy was implicit in the Griswold to Casey line of cases or that such a
right was made explicit in Lawrence. According to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, "these precedents recognize various substantive rights closely re-
lated to sexual intimacy, [but] none of them recognized the
overarching right to sexual privacy. ' '365 They went on to conclude that
no inquiry into the question of whether the petitioner's asserted right [to sexual intimacy] is one
of 'those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty norjustice would exist if they were sacrificed."' Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997)). The appeals court found another flaw in the Lawrence opinion barring recogni-
tion of a fundamental right to sexual intimacy: "[T]he opinion notably never provides the 'care-
ful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest' that is to accompany fundamental-
rights analysis." Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
The Eleventh Circuit placed further emphasis on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Law-
rence. The appeals court in Lofton quoted Justice Scalia questioning the significance of the ma-jority opinion in Lawrence because it did not "subject the Texas law to the standard of review
that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right."'
Id. at 817 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586). The appeals court similarly stated: "Most signifi-
cant, however, is the fact that the Lawrence Court never applied strict scrutiny, the proper stan-
dard when fundamental rights are implicated, but instead invalidated the Texas statute on
rational basis grounds." Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817. This criticism, however, ignores the fact that
the Court did not need to apply strict scrutiny analysis because the Court in Lawrence found that
the sodomy statute failed the rational basis test because it lacked any legitimate justification.
363. Williams, 378 F.3d. at 1236-37 (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Wil-
liams v. Attorney General of Alabama refers to the quotes in the dissenting opinion as constitut-
ing mere dicta, failing to establish a fundamental right to sexual intimacy including: "[T[he Due
Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of
the person." Id. at 1253-54 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66), and that "liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters per-
taining to sex." Id. at 1237 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572).
364. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2004).
365. Id. at 1237.
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"we decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right to sex-
ual privacy triggering strict scrutiny."
366
The Eleventh Circuit turned to an examination of the trial court's
independent finding of a "generalized 'right to sexual privacy"' that
was developed without reliance on Lawrence.367 The appeals court
found the district court's adoption of a right of sexual privacy termi-
nology failed to carefully frame any right at stake: "As formulated by
the district court, the right potentially encompasses a great universe of
sexual activities, including many that historically have been, and con-
tinue to be, prohibited. ' 368  Again echoing Justice Scalia's dissent in
Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit observed that "[i]f we were to accept
the invitation to recognize a right to sexual intimacy, this right would
theoretically encompass such activities as prostitution, obscenity, and
adult incest-even if we were to limit the right to consenting
adults." 369
The Eleventh Circuit took the view that broad rights to "privacy"
and "sexual privacy" were not implicated by the Alabama statute ban-
ning the commercial distribution of sexual devices.370 According to
the court, "the putative right at issue is the right to sell and purchase
sexual devices. ' 371 However, later in its opinion the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that the Supreme Court finding in Carey of a right to sell
contraceptives implicates the right to use contraceptives. 372 However,
the Eleventh Circuit appears to forget that the right to use contracep-
tives was originally derived from the right of privacy. 373 Instead, they
366. Id. at 1238. Echoing Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit refused to
recognize a right to sexual privacy because "it would be answering questions that the Lawrence
Court appears to have left for another day." Id. The appeals court further observed: "We save
for a later day consideration of whether Justice Scalia's (perhaps ominous) prediction that public
morality may no longer serve as a rational basis for legislation after Lawrence." Id. at 1238 n.9.
367. Id. at 1239. The Eleventh Circuit recognized that its earlier opinion remanding the case
could be read as referencing a fundamental right to sexual privacy: "It appears that this impres-
sion in our language was, at least in part, the source of the district court's over-broad framing of
the right on remand." Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239 n.10 (citing Williams 111, 220 F. Supp. 2d at
1276).
368. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239-40.
369. Compare id. at 1240, with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 590 ("State laws against bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral
choices." (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
370. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1241.
371. Id. at 1241-42.
372. Id.; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 (1977) ("Limiting the
distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists clearly imposes a signifi-
cant burden on the right of the individuals to use contraceptives if they choose to do so.").
373. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("The present case [involving con-
stitutional challenge to Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives], then, concerns a
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adopted a "slippery slope" or "parade of the horribles" argument that
a right to use sexual devices, which are directly related to acts of sex-
ual intimacy, would establish a right to use other illicit materials, such
as controlled substances, during acts of sexual intimacy:
The mere fact that a product is used within the privacy of the
bedroom, or that it enhances intimate conduct, does not in itself
bring the use of that article within the right to privacy. If it were
otherwise, individuals whose sexual gratification requires other
types of material or instrumentalities-perhaps hallucinogenic sub-
stances, depictions of child pornography or bestiality, or the services
of a willing prostitute-likewise would have a colorable argument
that prohibitions on such activities and materials interfere with theirprivacy in the bed chamber. Under this theory, all such sexual-en-
hancement paraphernalia (as long as it was used only in consensual
encounters between adults) would also be encompassed within the
right to privacy-and any burden thereon subject to strict
scrutiny.374
Even if such illicit materials were used as part of acts of sexual inti-
macy, then it is likely that statutes regulating or proscribing their use
would survive strict scrutiny. There is a stark contrast between thejustification for controlled substance statutes that prohibit use of hal-
lucinogenic drugs, whether or not that use occurs during acts of sexual
intimacy, and a statute that has no valid justification, effectively
preventing the use of sexual devices during acts of sexual intimacy.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court failed to estab-
lish affirmative protection of a right to use such devices. 375 The Elev-
enth Circuit rejected the claim that the constitutional right of privacy
protected commercial distribution of sexual devices and went on to
"hold that the district court committed reversible error in concluding
that the Due Process Clause 'encompasses a right to use sexual de-
vices like ... vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas."' 376
The dissenting opinion in Williams provides a much more convinc-
ing reading of Lawrence. It supports the conclusion that the Alabama
statute prohibiting sale of sexual devices iolated the substantive due
process right of adults to engage in private, consensual, sexual activity,
and that the statute therefore lacked a rational basis since the onlyjustification given for the statute was the furtherance of public moral-
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees.").
374. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1241 n.12 (11th Cir. 2004).
375. Id. at 1244.
376. Id. at 1250.
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ity.377 The dissent paralleled the analysis in Lawrence by formulating
the issue as a matter involving "the constitutionally protected right to
be left alone in [the] privacy of their bedrooms and personal relation-
ships" rather than "about sex or about sexual devices."
378 The dissent
observed that the majority in Williams recognized that the majority in
Lawrence found the Texas criminal sodomy statute unconstitutional,
but the majority failed to recognize the basis of the Court's ruling.
37 9
In the dissent's view, "Lawrence held that a state may not criminalize
sodomy because of the existence of the very right to private sexual
intimacy that the majority [in the instant case] refuses to
acknowledge. "380
The Eleventh Circuit dissenting opinion asserted that "[t]here is no
question that Lawrence was decided on substantive due process
grounds."' 381 The dissent observed that the Lawrence Court relied on
the right of privacy line of opinions from Griswold to Casey for its
finding in Lawrence that "[i]ncluded within the right to privacy is the
ability to make decisions about intimate sexual matters.
' 382 Accord-
ing to the dissent, however, the Supreme Court gave explicit recogni-
tion to the right of sexual privacy that was implicit or implicated in the
Court's prior privacy decisions. The dissent observed, "Lawrence
found that at the time of the Bowers decision the Court's prior hold-
ings had already made 'abundantly clear' that individuals have a sub-
stantive due process right to make decisions 'concerning the
intimacies of their physical relationship[s], even when not intended to
produce offspring.'1, 383 The dissent argued that the Supreme Court
invalidated the Texas sodomy statute because it violated a fundamen-
tal right to sexual privacy: "In invalidating the sodomy statute at issue
in Lawrence, the Court reaffirmed this right to sexual privacy, finding
377. Id. at 1250-60 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (construing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003)).
378. Compare id. at 1250 (Barkett J., dissenting), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct
[right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy] demeans the claim the individual put for-
ward .... [Criminal sodomy statutes] have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of
places, the home.
Id.
379. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1251 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing majority opinion at 1236).
380. Id. at 1251 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
381. Id. at 1252 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 1252-53 n.7 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965) (right to use contraception); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992)
(right to seek out an abortion)).
383. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1254 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
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that private homosexual conduct is likewise encompassed within
it. ' '384 Likewise, this led the dissent to conclude that the right of sex-
ual privacy encompasses the right to use sexual devices with the result
that the Alabama statute preventing the use of sexual devices is inva-
lid. The dissent further argued that "[a]pplying the analytical frame-
work of Lawrence compels the conclusion that the Due Process
Clause protects a right to sexual privacy that encompasses the use of
sexual devices. '385
The dissent in Williams noted the manner in which the Supreme
Court in Lawrence formulated the issue raised by the challenge to the
constitutionality of the Texas criminal sodomy statute: "We conclude
the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners
were free as adults to engage in the private [sexual] conduct in the
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. ' 3 6 The dissent declared unequivocally that the
opinion of the Supreme Court in Lawrence established a fundamental
right to sexual intimacy. Moreover, the dissent asserted that "[t]he
Lawrence Court's answer to its question of whether adults have a right
to engage in private sexual conduct is clearly a binding holding." 387
The dissent found that the Alabama statute prohibiting the sale of
sexual devices involved the same vital liberty interest in adult sexual
intimacy threatened by the sodomy statutes addressed first in Bowers
and then in Lawrence. The dissent maintained that like the finding
regarding the criminal sodomy law in Lawrence, the state statute
prohibiting the sale of sexual devices represented an invalid burden
on the interest in sexual intimacy because Alabama failed to establish
any valid justification for the statute. 388
384. Id. at 1253 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562).
385. Id. at 1251 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
386. Id. at 1256 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564).
387. Id. at 1256 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 1256 (Barkett, J., dissenting). The dissent argued:
The majority states that Lawrence held that sodomy laws fail rational basis review.
However, the majority neglects to address whether Alabama's statute has a rational
basis even though Alabama relies upon the same justification for criminalizing private
sexual activity rejected by Lawrence-public morality. In Lawrence, Texas had explic-
itly relied upon public morality as a rational basis for its sodomy law. Lawrence sum-
marily rejected Texas' argument . . . . In Williams II, this Court previously upheld
Alabama's law on rational basis grounds, relying on the now defunct Bowers to con-
clude that public morality provides a legitimate state interest .... Obviously, now that
Bowers has been overruled, this proposition is no longer good law and we must, accord-
ingly, revisit our holding in Williams I1.
Id. at 1259-60 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The recognition of a constitutional right to sexual intimacy has in-
volved almost a half century of Supreme Court opinions grappling
with a right of privacy that was established applying the concept of
substantive due process under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Confronting issues of marriage, procreation,
contraception, and abortion, the Supreme Court's opinions estab-
lished rights that implicated a broader claim to a right of adults to
engage in acts of private, consensual, sexual intimacy. While initially
finding in Bowers that homosexuals had no right to engage in sodomy,
the Lawrence Court's review of the holding explicitly found that
adults have a liberty interest in consensual, private, sexual activity,
which includes the right of heterosexuals as well as homosexuals to
engage in private, consensual sodomy. The fact that the Court failed
to explicitly state that the right of sexual privacy is a fundamental
right, and because it applied a rational basis test in striking down a
state criminal sodomy statute that had been justified only on the inad-
equate grounds of public morality, some courts remain uncertain as to
the existence, scope, and status of the right to sexual privacy estab-
lished by Lawrence. This uncertainty is apparent in recent decisions
of the Eleventh Circuit dealing with a state statute proscribing the sale
of sexual devices. A close reading of the opinions in that case suggests
that the dissenting opinion in Williams is correct in its conclusion that
the majority in Lawrence established a right to sexual intimacy on sub-
stantive due process grounds that should be recognized as a funda-
mental right, thus requiring that any state regulation of adult private,
consensual, sexual intimacy be justified by a compelling state interest,
and that any such legislation must be narrowly drawn.
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